

published monthly since 1866

Fortnightly

FOUNDED IN 1865 BY ANTHONY TROLLOPE

MAY, 1952

MXIV N.S.

Illinois U Library

CONTENTS

BUTLER'S BUDGET

AN OIL

IONS OF LISBON

ONALISM IN THE GOLD COAST—II.

CAN NATIONALISM—*Some Comments*

KENNETH BRADLEY, H. H. E. PEACOCK,

ANTHONY SILLERY, JACK SIMMONS

E OR BEEF IN KENYA

FOURTH YEAR OF ISRAEL

BLOODLESS REVOLUTION—I.

UNIVERSITY IN AMERICA

HERING PALM—A *Poem*

AL IMAGES

SIR READER BULLARD

KENNETH LINDSAY

ASA BRIGGS

S. R. CLELAND SCOTT

NORMAN BENTWICH

J. H. HUIZINGA

BARRY TRAPNELL

MARGARET STANLEY-WRENCH

JOSHUA C. GREGORY

The Fortnightly Library :

STRENUOUS LIFE

GRACE A. WOOD

Contributors : W. H. Johnston, N. P. Macdonald, Nigel Bruce, Henry
Jaerlein, Rupert Martin, John Halet, J. F. Burnet, F. S. Boas, Herbert T.
Banyard, G. F. McCleary, Grace Banyard.

3s. 6d. or

55 CENTS

USA 60 CENTS

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

42s PER ANNUM or

U.S.A. \$6.50

CANADA \$7.00

ALL CLASSES
OF INSURANCE •
TRANSACTION

CAR & GENERAL

INSURANCE CORPORATION LIMITED

83, PALL MALL, LONDON, S.W.1

Will You be a friend of The Church Army?

Your gift will be welcomed very gratefully by The Church Army, whose work depends more than ever on your generosity.

For 70 years The Church Army has ministered to the needs of all classes and all ages . . . a work made possible by the kindly thoughtfulness of people of good will.

*Please send your Gift to The Rev. E. Wilson Carlile, General Secretary,
The Church Army, 55, Bryanston Street, London, W.1.*



IMPERIAL CANCER RESEARCH FUND

Incorporated by Royal Charter 1939

President—THE RT. HON. THE EARL OF HALIFAX, K.G., P.C.

Chairman of the Council—PROFESSOR H. R. DEAN, M.D., F.R.C.P.

Honorary Treasurer—SIR HOLBURT WARING, Bt., C.B.E., F.R.C.S.

Director—DR. JAMES CRAIGIE, O.B.E., F.R.S.

The Fund was founded in 1902 under the direction of the Royal College of Physicians of London and the Royal College of Surgeons of England, and is governed by representatives of many medical and scientific institutions. It is a centre for research and information on cancer and carries on continuous and systematic investigations in up-to-date laboratories at Mill Hill. Our knowledge has so increased that the disease is now curable in ever greater numbers.

LEGACIES, DONATIONS AND SUBSCRIPTIONS ARE URGENTLY NEEDED FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND EXTENSION OF OUR WORK.

Subscriptions should be sent to the Honorary Treasurer, Sir Holburt Waring, Bt., at Royal College of Surgeons, Lincoln's Inn Fields, London W.C.2.

FORM OF BEQUEST.

I hereby bequeath the sum of £ _____ to the Imperial Cancer Research Fund (Treasurer, Sir Holburt Waring, Bt.), at Royal College of Surgeons of England, Lincoln's Inn Fields, London, W.C.2., for the purpose of Scientific Research, and I direct that the Treasurer's receipt shall be a good discharge for such legacy.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

Published Monthly by The Fortnightly Review, Ltd., at 4, 5 & 6, Soho Sq., London, W.1.

APRIL, 1952

	PAGE
MR. BUTLER'S BUDGET	217
PERSIAN OIL. BY SIR READER BULLARD	219
LESSONS OF LISBON. BY KENNETH LINDSAY	226
NATIONALISM IN THE GOLD COAST—II. BY ASA BRIGGS	231
AFRICAN NATIONALISM— <i>Some Comments.</i> BY KENNETH BRADLEY, H. H. E. PEACOCK, ANTHONY SILLERY, JACK SIMMONS	237
GAME OR BEEF IN KENYA. By S. R. CLELAND SCOTT	243

THE FORTNIGHTLY

Subscription Rates

(Including Postage)

Surface mail to all parts of the world :

12 Months	42s.
6 "	21s.
3 "	10s. 6d.
U.S.A. (12 months)	\$6.50c.
CANADA "	\$7.00

SUBSCRIPTION FORM

To : Circulation Manager, THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, LTD.,
4, 5 & 6, Soho Square, LONDON, W.1.

Please send THE FORTNIGHTLY for months
to the following address. I enclose remittance for

Name

Address

CONTENTS—*contd.*

THE FOURTH YEAR OF ISRAEL. BY NORMAN BENTWICH	249
THE BLOODLESS REVOLUTION—I. BY J. H. HUIZINGA	255
THE UNIVERSITY IN AMERICA. BY BARRY TRAPNELL	262
GATHERING PALM— <i>A Poem.</i> BY MARGARET STANLEY-WRENCH	268
VISUAL IMAGES. BY JOSHUA C. GREGORY	269

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY:

THE STRENUOUS LIFE. BY GRACE A. WOOD	275
---	-----

Other Contributors: *W. H. Johnston, N. P. Macdonald, Nigel Bruce, Henry Baerlein, Rupert Martin, Canon John Halet, J. F. Burnet, F. S. Boas, Herbert T. Banyard, G. F. McCleary, Grace Banyard.*

- ¶ While the Editor is glad to consider articles offered for publication, he cannot undertake to return MSS. unless accompanied by a stamped envelope.
- ¶ The Editorial, Advertising and General Business Offices of THE FORTNIGHTLY are at 4, 5 & 6, Soho Square, London, W.1.
- ¶ Entered as second-class matter, January 4, 1934, at the Post Office at New York, N.Y., under the Act of March 3, 1897 (Sec. 397 P.L. & R.).
- ¶ Registered for transmission by Canadian Magazine Post.

ENGLAND'S DISTRESS

AND

PERPLEXITIES

will increase

UNTIL THE BISHOPS OPEN

JOANNA SOUTHCOTT'S BOX

OF SEALED WRITINGS

What the Bible says about the Box
and the Bishops:

"And the temple of God was opened . . . and there was seen . . . the Ark (Chest or Box) of his Testament (or Will)."

"And round about the Throne were four-and twenty . . . Elders (Bishops) sitting . . . (and they) fall down . . . and cast their crowns (their wisdom) before the Throne."

Rev. xi. 19: iv. 4, 10.

For Information and Free Leaflets write to:—

THE PANACEA SOCIETY,
Bedford, England

WHERE TO STAY

WELLINGTON HOTEL

TUNBRIDGE WELLS.

Delightfully situated at the summit of the Common facing South. Private suites at moderate terms. Lock-up Garage. Passenger Lift. First-class management.

Hot and cold water and gas fires in bedrooms.

UNSURPASSED FOR SITUATION AND SERVICE

Telephone: 1150.

Proprietors: Trust Houses Ltd.

MISS CONNIE WINN

reopens **UPLANDS, ALDEBURGH**, Suffolk as Hotel from April. ARTISTS specially welcomed during MAY when life models, criticism from well known artists provided.

Tel. Renown 4154 LONDON
or write Aldeburgh

LLANGOLLEN. Hand Hotel. One of the best in N. Wales. H. & C. water all rooms. Facing River Dee, free fishing (trout). A.A. & R.A.C. Tel. 3207.

THE FORTNIGHTLY

APRIL, 1952

MR. BUTLER'S BUDGET

AS described in *Hansard*, the conclusion of Mr. Butler's Budget speech is reminiscent of Macaulay's account of the passing of the Reform Bill 120 years ago—Honourable Members cheering, waving Order Papers, and a general impression of a historic occasion. During the weeks that have followed calmer views have gained ground. The Budget signalizes a change of Government, not the accession to power of a new class. The aggregate burden is practically unchanged; the novelty in the Budget lies in the way in which it uses psychology as a factor in government. And indeed, in view of the problems facing the Chancellor, it was obvious that the weight of the Budget could not be reduced much. He had to re-arm—the Government had added £200 millions to the arms bill. They are proposing to correct vigorously the country's overseas trade accounts, and they have to do this while maintaining a respectable standard of living. The last is perhaps the most important aspect of modern fiscal practice. In a parliamentary democracy no party can afford to confront the electorate in times of peace with a Budget implying a Russian standard of austerity.

These are wide demands, and accordingly the Budget is no more than part of a more comprehensive machinery designed to give the Government a very wide control indeed over the country's economic lay-out. The restoration of the Bank Rate is a relatively unimportant item. Since the Government had decided, rightly or wrongly, to control capital investment, it was sensible to make its use more expensive. The Government also had the technical advantage of a very smooth control over the banks through the Treasury and the Bank of England—a control dating back to long before nationalization. More significant was the fact that it was the Chancellor—and not the President of the Board of Trade—who announced the coming restrictions on imports. Yet this fact was an obvious corollary of developments going back to the great depression. The significance of the depression, as was recognized by the men responsible for the idea of the International Monetary Fund and kindred notions, was that the fluctuations in international trade were too great to be carried by the stocks of gold held by the different countries. Gold to-day is kept as a last reserve, and the great bulk of overseas trade is adjusted by deliberate official control. The last word rests with the Chancellor, because the forcing of exports which must be achieved if the foreign trade accounts are to be balanced threatens to create an inflationary situation, and this could wreck production for re-armament

and for other ends. It is for the Chancellor, as guardian of the currency, to avert this danger. But this is only another way of stating a much more important fact: it is the Chancellor's work so to distribute the national effort on consumption goods, capital goods, re-armament and overseas trade, as to adapt means to ends. The Budget is the most important agency in the machinery of planning.

The stage which has to-day been reached comes at the end of a fairly long evolution. A typical Budget by Gladstone contained provisions for defence—exiguous by modern standards—for the service of the National Debt, and for very little else. The State took the bare essentials for carrying on the Queen's Government, and left the rest, not to the public at large (relatively few had much capital to spare), but to the administration of a powerful governing class. The 1914-1918 war brought what was perhaps the most important stage. It forced the Government of the day to use the instrument of taxation to a degree hitherto unequalled to shape the national effort towards the end of making war. Simultaneously and of necessity, it introduced the mustard seed of war-socialism. Taxation reached its limit during the 1939-1945 war, when a reputable financial daily counselled its readers to "forget the gap". A highly significant peacetime development was introduced in Mr. Gaitskell's Budget last year, when the Chancellor explicitly took into his calculations the contribution which private capital formation was likely to make towards closing the inflationary gap. Where Gladstone had treated the national economy as a purely private affair, subject only to certain minimal deductions for the essentials of Government, Mr. Gaitskell regarded the public and the private sectors of the economy as forming a single whole. This whole was not subject to governmental control in its entirety; but it had to be treated as a single whole, all of whose dimensions had to be subjected to the most exact measurement possible by a Government directing so large a part.

The significant aspect of Mr. Butler's Budget is not that he has slightly changed its total weight, but that he has extended its scope by deliberately making it a psychological force. In a sense this means nothing more than that he has used the Budget to the advantage of certain classes—classes of admitted economic importance—whose votes might be useful at a future election. But he has also deliberately used the Budget to provide incentives towards higher production (at the rate of £250 million a year), an addition without which there must be a critical shortfall in the standard of living, in re-armament, or in exports. Like Bacon, he has decided that "no people overcharged with tribute is fit for empire" and has acted accordingly. But the fact that he has designed a more effective carrot means that the field for the exercise of free will among the public is being restricted, not expanded. It is the power of the Government that is growing.

PERSIAN OIL

BY SIR READER BULLARD

AT the time of the oil crisis the essential points of the dispute were not always clearly understood, and even now there are many persons who appear to believe that with greater goodwill on the part of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and better timing by the British Government a settlement could have been effected. It may therefore be useful to examine again not only the British case, but also the deep causes on the Persian side that worked against a settlement.

What the British Government objected to was of course not the nationalization of the Persian oil industry but the breach of the 1933 Agreement in which the Persian Government promised not to annul or modify the A.I.O.C. concession unilaterally, and to submit to arbitration any dispute that the parties might fail to settle between themselves. These guarantees, and the extension of the concession period, were not given to the Company for nothing; in return the Company not only agreed to pay substantially higher royalties, but accepted an enormous reduction in the concession area, which in the original concession of 1901 covered the whole of Persia except the five northern provinces. Another misconception was about the so-called 'fifty-fifty' plan. It was widely alleged that whereas American oil companies were forward to offer equal division of their profits, the A.I.O.C., blind equally to justice and to their own interests, resisted to the last this generous policy. In fact a fifty-fifty offer was made to the Persian Government by the A.I.O.C. in 1948—two years before it came into force in any other territory in the Middle East; only it was wrecked by a Persian demand that it should apply to all the Company's profits, even, for instance, to those earned in Iraq or Kuwait. As an alternative the Company worked out the draft agreement which was eventually signed by the Persian Government in 1949 but was never ratified by the Persian Parliament. It is maintained by the Company that if there were even a slight set-back in trade this agreement would give the Persian Government at least as much as a fifty-fifty arrangement; but it is less easy to understand, being studded with clauses designed to protect Persian interests in bad years—clauses which arose out of a dispute with Riza Shah during the war, when his revenue fell heavily with the fall in oil exports in 1939-1940. Whatever the merits or the defects of the 1949 draft agreement it failed to pass the Chamber

of Deputies, and in February 1951 the Company again made a fifty-fifty offer. This was over two months before Dr. Mossadeq became Prime Minister, so that if what he wanted was to secure as good terms as those enjoyed by any other Middle East government, he had only to accept the offer; but by then the oil industry of Persia had been declared to have been nationalized. Nationalization was proposed by Dr. Mossadeq, a Chairman of the Parliamentary Oil Commission, about a week after the Company's second fifty-fifty offer, and the proposal was approved by the Chamber of Deputies the day after the murder of the Prime Minister Razmara, and passed by the Senate the day after the murder of the Minister of Education.

It is probable that the most potent cause of Dr. Mossadeq's attitude was the Russian attempt to obtain a concession for the oil of North Persia in 1944. To evade this menace the Persian Government decided to postpone all oil talks until after the war. This decision affected not only the Russians, but also two American companies and the Royal Dutch Shell, whose representatives had been negotiating for a concession in the south. These representatives withdrew, recognizing the right of an independent government to dispose freely of its natural resources, but the Russians made such ferocious attacks on the Persian Government that they blocked their own path; for the Deputies, fearing lest the Russians should extract a secret promise of a concession from someone in authority rushed through the Chamber a Bill brought forward by Dr. Mossadeq providing under heavy penalties that oil concessions should not even be discussed with any foreigner or foreign State. This law was violated by a later Prime Minister, Qavam al Saltana, when he promised to bring in a Bill for the establishment of a Russo-Persian company for the exploitation of the oil of North Persia; he preferred to use this device to get rid of the Russian troops left in Persia after the treaty date, rather than to appeal to the United Nations to persuade or compel the Russians to withdraw. When at last laid before the Chamber of Deputies the Bill was rejected with only two dissentient votes. One of the chief speaker against the Bill was Dr. Mossadeq, but it was noticeable that his criticisms were directed as much against the A.I.O.C. concession as against the Russian proposals. One of his chief complaints was that the royalties had been misspent, though how anyone but the rulers of Persia and in particular Riza Shah could be blamed for that he did not explain. It seems clear that Dr. Mossadeq regarded it as a corollary of the law of 1944 that the A.I.O.C. should be eliminated, without regard to its legal rights. The Russians argued that the refusal of their application for an oil concession constituted unfriendly discrimination, since the British had a concession in the south. Dr. Mossadeq seems to have turned this argument round, and to hold that since it would be dangerous to give a concession to the Russians, who would set to work to sovietize

the north of Persia, the existing concession should be taken away from the British company, to ensure equality of treatment. In so far as the legal aspect was ever considered by Dr. Mossadeq, he seems to hold that "nationalization" overrides in some mystical way a written promise not to annul or modify a concession unilaterally. The ultimate object of the policy is to be neutral in any war, cold or hot. The Russians, the argument runs, will no longer have cause to be jealous of the British and will therefore let Persia alone, while the British, having no oil interests in Persia, will have no cause to drag Persia into war. Neutrality has been declared by an official Persian spokesman to be the policy of his country which, he added, is therefore not interested in the Middle East Command. And in January 1952 the United States Government, which for several years had been extending military aid to Persia as well as to Greece and Turkey, stopped the despatch of arms to Persia because of her failure to comply with the Mutual Security Act.

In his extremist policy Dr. Mossadeq had two powerful allies: Ayatullah Kashani and the Tudeh Party. Kashani, one of the chief *mujtahids* (religious dignitaries) in Persia, is the religious leader of the Fadayan-i-Islam, from whose fanatical ranks came the men who killed Razmara and the Minister of Education. Kashani openly approved Razmara's murder and threatened a similar fate for anyone who should take the wrong political path. The ethics and wisdom of political murder apart, it is doubtful whether the acquisition of power by the *mujtahids* can benefit Persia. In Riza Shah's time they opposed the westernization of Persia and in particular the introduction of western legal codes and the emancipation of women, and after a long period of enforced silence during his reign they have begun to recover influence, to the extent that in some country districts women have been compelled to take to the veil again. Even if Kashani were not, as a *mujtahid*, anti-foreign, he would probably be anti-British, as he was one of the Persians who were interned during the war, under Anglo-Persian supervision, for anti-Ally activities. Among Dr. Mossadeq's entourage there were at least two more of these internees: the Minister of the Interior, and his own son-in-law, a Senator and a member of the Oil Commission.

The Tudeh Party, with its Communist nucleus, was a strange bed-fellow for Dr. Mossadeq, the rich landowner, and Kashani, the *mujtahid* with reactionary social aims, but it was only following the new policy of shouting against the "imperialist" and the "capitalist" without raising the issue of Communism. In Persia the Tudeh Party attracts not only Communists, who are probably not numerous, but also many people drawn to it as the only body which is a political party in the western sense. Political life in Persia consists as a rule in the grouping of Deputies round a prominent man who may hope to become Prime Minister and to carry his supporters into office with him. The pro-

grammes of such leaders differ little from each other, and whoever gets into power little useful legislation is ever proposed, still less passed, the time being taken up in political manoeuvre. The Tudeh Party, though nominally proscribed, afforded valuable help to Dr. Mossadeq under various guises in the early stages of the dispute. Only later was an attempt made to arrest its leaders.

Even with these allies Dr. Mossadeq could not have secured the wide support he at first enjoyed if the minds of the public had not been predisposed towards his policy. Just as every employee is inclined to doubt whether he gets a "fair" wage, so even if the Persians had been correctly informed instead of grossly misled by the press and the official radio, they would still have believed that they were getting less than their fair share of the profits on Persian oil. The accusation that the A.I.O.C. were bad employers is not supported by the I.L.O. inquiry, and can be refuted by anyone who has seen conditions in the oil area, so much better than anywhere else in Persia; nevertheless the accusation was widely accepted. Then the feeling of humiliation that the one great industry in the country should be controlled by foreigners was not restrained by realization of the difficulties involved in its management. Many Persians may have accepted as valid the remark made by a Senator in reply to Razmara's question how a country which lost money on a State cement factory could run an oil industry. The Senator described this as a libel on the race that created the Persian miniature.

Dr. Mossadeq's strongest ally however was the readiness of the Persian to believe that it is always someone else's fault; Dr. Mossadeq shares this characteristic in a high degree. He has even declared that the Americans, who in addition to their military aid had advanced \$24 millions to Persia, had limited their help to "a few bags of D.D.T." But the British have been his main target. Had they not introduced their insidious influence even into the Palace, and by their intrigues in America prevented him from securing a loan? Most people would attribute mainly to fanatical Persian propaganda the riots in Abadan which brought intimidation and insult to many British employees of the A.I.O.C. and a brutal death to three of them, but according to Dr. Mossadeq they were caused by the Company to discredit his Government. If the tribes are murmuring, it cannot be because of present grievances and a long history of neglect or misgovernment: they must have been stirred up by British agents. If it took Dr. Mossadeq from 1941, when Riza Shah abdicated, to 1952 to become Prime Minister, it cannot be because the Deputies preferred other men but because of "foreign" influences. The Persian then hates moral responsibility; he must have a scapegoat, and for him the permanent scapegoat is Great Britain.

How is it that the country to which Persia obviously owed her

independence in the nineteenth century has become to Persians the villain of the piece? Ironically, the very success with which Great Britain defended not only Persia but the Middle East in general against Russian aggression helped to bring this about. In two wars between Russia and Persia in the early part of the nineteenth century Great Britain acted as peacemaker, receiving on one occasion the thanks of both parties. Better known are the efforts of Great Britain in the Crimea and after the 1878 war to save Turkey from domination by Russia, and her resistance to Russian designs on Afghanistan. If on the other hand Persia was twice involved in war with Great Britain, that was because Britain demanded for Afghanistan, menaced by Persian aggression instigated by Russia, the independence she wanted for Persia. And on neither occasion did the British, after defeating the Persians, ask for territorial or other compensation. It thus came to be taken for granted that any threat to the Middle East would be met by Great Britain by armed resistance, and the Persians have never forgiven us for having fallen short of that expectation in 1907. Ever since the Congress of Berlin turned Russia away from Turkey she had acted aggressively in North Persia; but in 1907, exhausted by the war with Japan and by the revolution of 1905, she was prepared to compromise about Persia as well as about Afghanistan and Tibet. On the other hand Great Britain could foresee the coming war with Germany, and not being strong enough to quarrel with Russia and Germany at the same time, she too was obliged to compromise. This arrangement, though designed to keep Russia as far to the north as possible, has never been understood by the Persians, who describe it as "carving up" their country, and since then they have made Great Britain the scapegoat for all their ills, in particular for the faults of Riza Shah. They were well satisfied during the early years of his reign, for they enjoyed public security for the first time for generations, and the status of their country among the nations rose considerably; but later he became arbitrary and avaricious, and they invented the theory that the British had placed him on the throne and maintained him there for their own ends, thus hiding from themselves the truth that if Riza Shah continued to misgovern them it was because no Persian dared to stand up to him. Not all Persian suspicions however are so absurd. We cannot deny that we have been the allies of Russia, Persia's ancient enemy, in two wars, and that British as well as Russian troops entered Persia in 1941. A good case can be made out for the Allied invasion, but the Persians, though they got rid of Riza Shah and recovered constitutional government as a by-product, and in the end found themselves on the winning side whereas they might have been dragged down with Germany, have added the invasion to the list of Britain's sins. The Persians might be expected to give the British credit for their behaviour in Persia during the war, as compared with the Russians' arbitrary conduct, their attempt

to detach one of the Persian provinces, and their retention of troops in Persia after the due date; but there is no sign of this. The Russians are expected to behave badly; the British, to behave as the Persians desire.

Britain being thus the political scapegoat, to make her the economic scapegoat in the oil dispute was easy. One wonders whether the mass of the people are as well satisfied with the result as Dr. Mossadeq professes to be. His satisfaction, in so far as it rests upon a hope of neutrality, could hardly survive a reading of those German archives published by the Americans, about the Russo-German negotiations in the early part of the war. When pressed to join the Axis the Russians laid down as one condition the recognition of a broad band of territory stretching from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf as *the centre of Soviet aspirations*—a band which would include Eastern Turkey, Eastern Iraq, Kuwait and western Persia, with the Persian, Iraqi and Kuwait oilfields. It is highly ingenuous to suppose that the mere elimination of the A.I.O.C. can deflect this age-long thrust towards the warm-water seas, reinforced as it now is by the attraction of half the oil in the world. As to the social consequences of Dr. Mossadeq's policy, the slums of Tehran which he attributed to the A.I.O.C. will not necessarily be swept away, if he is prepared to allow the oil to remain in the ground rather than compromise—a prospect bearable with greater equanimity by a rich landowner like Dr. Mossadeq than by a refinery hand thrown out of employment, or a peasant taxed yet more heavily because the oil revenue has vanished. We might think that at least some good had come out of evil if it appeared that the outburst against the British was a sign of a moral renaissance in Persia, but this seems to be ruled out by the orgy of self-pity we have witnessed and the determination of Persians to throw on the British the responsibility for all their ills. The truth should appear from the developments the Persians hope to carry out, if not with oil money, then with money provided by America. It is a commonplace that the gap between rich and poor in Persia and the failure of successive governments to relieve the misery of the people expose the country to Communist or other revolutionary propaganda. This obvious danger has not been overlooked by America, who has already advanced \$2 millions for development. Irrigation works are likely to figure largely in the programme. Now an American expert who studied Persian agriculture during the war felt that improvement was impossible unless Tehran became "country-minded" and unless what he called the feudal system was abolished. Again, while agreeing that more irrigation was required, he declared that much of the existing water was wasted on weeds. The labourer has little inducement to weed the land because his share of the crop—normally one-fifth—is so small. There is however no sign that Dr. Mossadeq and his followers have a policy of fundamental agricultural reform. Indeed, when Kashani was asked his opinion of

he Shah's decision to cede the Crown lands to the peasants on easy terms, he said that this was unnecessary for when Persia got her oil there would be plenty of land, and it would be unnecessary to divide up any states, whether large or small. To make a dam and irrigate fresh land is not a difficult operation; what is difficult is to allocate the new land justly and profitably. Certain Crown lands in Seistan which were allocated for private ownership have been found to be almost entirely in the hands of large landowners, while the loans from the Persian Agricultural Bank rarely go to the kind of person such banks are supposed to assist. It would try the powers of the best statesmen, enjoying complete freedom of action, to install on the new land men deserving of help and likely to be most profitable to the State; but any committee charged with such a task would be swamped with demands and even orders from influential persons to allocate lands to their friends or relatives or political protégés. When Persians can do this kind of job with reasonable care and fairness, then there will be hope for their country. Abuse of Great Britain will lead nowhere. More self-help is needed, and less self-pity.

The author was H.M. Minister and later Ambassador at Tehran from 1939 to 1946.)

LESSONS OF LISBON

BY KENNETH LINDSAY

THREE years ago—on April 3, 1949—the foreign ministers of twelve nations, including Mr. Ernest Bevin, signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. Since then the North Atlantic Council has met successively three times in Washington, in London, New York, Brussels, Ottawa and Rome. The ninth session was held this February at Lisbon, in the Iberian peninsular, on the European shores of the Atlantic. On this occasion the chairman was a Canadian, Mr. Lester Pearson, and it was his privilege to welcome two new members, Greece and Turkey.

It is well to remember the earlier sequence of events in order to see N.A.T.O. and Lisbon in true post-war perspective. General Marshall made his famous speech at Harvard on June 5, 1947. Mr. Bevin took the initiative with Mr. Bidault of France and issued invitations for a meeting in Paris of the European powers. Sixteen countries were represented at the conference which opened on July 12, 1947, under the chairmanship of Sir Oliver Franks. The Convention for European Economic Co-operation was signed in Paris on April 16, 1948. The Americans then set up a special body, the Economic Co-operation Administration (E.C.A.), to dispense Marshall Aid. The Europeans established a receiving body known as the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (O.E.E.C.). Sir Edmund Hall-Patch has been four times elected chairman of this important body. At the same time and in a setting which was becoming more critical the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries signed the Brussels Treaty (March 17, 1948). The Treaty provided for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for mutual assistance in the event of any party becoming the object of armed attack in Europe. By September 1948 a defence committee was established and finally a joint military organization known as Uniforce under the direction of Field-Marshal Montgomery with headquarters at Fontainebleau. The North Atlantic Treaty is the direct descendant of the Brussels Treaty.

On a more popular front between 1947 and 1949 there was born the European Movement. The Hague Conference in the spring of 1948 led by Mr. Churchill launched the idea of European unity and by May 1949 the Statute of Europe was signed by eleven countries. In addition

the Brussels Treaty powers there were the Irish Republic, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Italy and Northern Ireland. Later Iceland, Greece, Turkey, Germany and the Saar took their seats in the Consultative Assembly, which has met for one month in 1949, 1950 and 1951. On the last occasion there was a joint session with American Senators and Congressmen.

Within Europe itself six powers, France, Italy, western Germany and the three Benelux countries have for the last two years been struggling to bring into existence two supra-national bodies, the Schuman coal and steel plan and the European army, now called the European Defence Community. At the time of the Ottawa meeting of N.A.T.O. last September Mr. Morrison, meeting with Mr. Acheson and Mr. Schuman in the United States, put forward what is known as the Washington Declaration. British official policy invented a new expression. In future we were to be "associated with" European developments, whether Schuman or Pleven plans, but always within a widening development of the Atlantic Community. This policy was confirmed by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden on their recent visit to Washington: "Our two Governments will continue to give their full support to the efforts now being made to establish a European Defence Community. We believe that this is the best way of bringing a democratic Germany into a purely defensive organization for European security" and "we are resolved to build an Atlantic Community not only for defence, but for enduring progress." But Mr. Eden added in a speech at Columbia, New York, referring to the frequent suggestions that Britain should join a European federation: "This is something we know in our bones we cannot do . . . our thoughts move across the seas to the many communities in which our people play their part in every corner of the world. That is our life; without it we should be no more than some millions of people living on an island off the coasts of Europe."

I mention these dates, facts and quotations partly to explain that both political parties appear to be committed to the same general policy, and partly to demonstrate the maze of organizations that have been created since the Marshall speech. First, there are fifteen, only fifteen, European countries in the United Nations and a larger number, in practice all, belonging to its off-shoot the Economic Commission for Europe (E.C.E.) situated at Geneva. Secondly there is the Council of Europe with its Consultative Assembly at Strasbourg and a membership of fifteen. At the moment this is a hybrid organization and might be described as an indirectly elected or appointed parliament, with full powers of speech but none of action. Thirdly there are one or two supra-national bodies, partially formed and partially ratified by national parliaments, such as the Schuman Plan and European Army. Fourthly, there is the O.E.E.C., a novel inter-governmental agency, with a most important off-shoot, the

European Payments Union (E.P.U.). Lastly, there are the Brussel Treaty and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) which are military alliances, coupled with important political, social and cultural clauses. Behind these various organizations there are several voluntary movements of citizens. These include the United Nations Association (U.N.A.), the European Movement with its Federalist wing, and an incipient Atlantic Movement, strongest in the United States, but with groups in France, Britain, Norway and Denmark. It is little wonder that the ordinary citizen finds foreign policy confusing. But the hard fact remains that in each case these organizations have been created by members of the free world to meet what they deemed to be an urgent need. If they resemble a series of tactical measures, this is due partly to the absence of any grand strategy and partly to the enduring nationalist sentiment which is never very far from the surface and which constantly threatens to crack the foundations.

At Ottawa the Atlantic Council held its first genuine council of cold war. It cleared the ground by appointing committees to consider how to reconcile military defence with politico-economic capabilities of member countries, how to reconcile European and Atlantic defence, how to develop closer co-operation in foreign and economic affairs and how to create out of its own scattered and unwieldy bureaux an effective political organization. The difficulties have been enormous. They consist partly of internal strains within the respective countries and partly of a permanent difference of approach between the United States and Europe. It is no easy task to get good team work between fourteen countries, so diverse in wealth, size, geography and temperament. Even when agreement is reached, as it was at Lisbon, there is the further difficulty of placating minorities and securing a genuine international sanction.

There is a different approach between the American and European point of view. Washington is thinking in terms of tactics, Europe more in terms of strategy. If the United States consults Europe before it acts there may be some restraint on the policy-makers in the National Security Council, an important new wing of the American cabinet. It has been said that the difference between Washington on the one hand and London and Paris on the other is the difference between G.H.Q. and the men in the trenches. They think in terms of anti-Communism, war in terms of full-employment and a guarantee of enough food. Europe has had to remind America of these anxieties and of the need for raw materials. In a word, the two objectives of the Marshall Plan, averting economic and political collapse and securing economic and political co-operation have not yet been achieved. Is N.A.T.O. just an anti-Russian alliance or a new form of international organization based on

n nationality but on identity of aims and interests?

We have seen that Britain has rejected anything which smacks of supra-national authority and favours the inter-governmental type of organization. Hence her association with Western Union which later became merged into N.A.T.O. and also her leadership of O.E.E.C. Is it possible to separate purely European questions from those which are United States plus European? It would seem that the N.A.T.O. framework is essential to hold together such groupings as the European Defence Community, Britain, Scandinavia and South-East Europe. Yet at times it would seem that the British are trying to build a new British-centred balance of power system. Mr. Eden's Columbia speech seemed to hark back to the Dunkirk analogy which is no longer realistic. It is well to remember that after Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain there rained on us more deadly weapons. Socialists have their own reasons for being sceptical of European entanglements, but it is noticeable that Woodrow Wyatt and many others now favour our joining a European army. It is possible that the retention of a curious, self-centred provincialism, what Señor de Madariaga calls "the channel-complex", can be a mortal menace to our survival in the modern world. The British are not prepared to exchange the known advantages of the central position in the Commonwealth for the hypothetical benefits of political union with Europe. It must be to some stronger organization that we resign the conduct of our most vital military and economic security. We do wrong to suggest that France can cope alone with Germany and our intransigence raises doubts in the minds of the Benelux countries. Hence the consolidation of Europe has hung fire. The truth is that only the permanent military and diplomatic participation of the United States can provide an effective defence of western civilization. The fact that America has broken with the past is an act of the first order in courage and imagination. It is claimed that the decisions made at Lisbon were historic, because they involved the final terms for the end of the Allied occupation of Germany, agreement on the relation of N.A.T.O. to the European Defence Community and the establishment and concentration of a permanent Atlantic Council in Paris. I would reserve the word 'historic' for another aspect of the conference. The significant fact is that fourteen nations, European and North American, have faced the varied and complicated financial and economic questions that inevitably arise from any attempt at collective security in the modern world. Germany's new status, France's legitimate fears, N.A.T.O.'s demands for more divisions in Europe had to be settled simultaneously or not at all. Without the authority of the North Atlantic Council, without frank speaking by some of the smaller States, these agreements could never have been reached.

Was Dean Acheson justified in saying that "along with the British

Commonwealth and the United Nations, N.A.T.O. must rank as one of the great democratic institutions invented in half a century"? If it were a genuine federal body, it would have its own electorate; if it were a supra-national body, it would have its own elected assembly. But this is something new and different. It is a democratic institution, but one indirectly related to several national parliaments and still less indirectly to the people. Many persons, statesmen, soldiers, administrators and economists have helped to shape this formidable instrument but unless there is a grass-roots foundation in public opinion, N.A.T.O. could become an air-bound bureaucracy. Dean Acheson also said: "The job we now face is the hard, unspectacular one of translating decisions into action" and Lester Pearson added: "If we do not by our results convince our peoples, they will begin to lose interest and weaken in their support of the North Atlantic coalition." Fortunately there is a growing public support in many countries.

It will require much patience and a far deeper understanding of the issues involved if public opinion and national parliaments are to march in step with the decisions of the Lisbon conference. Nationalism, called by different names in each country, but already it is rearing its head again; neutralism and Bevanism are very much alive. There is nothing inconsistent between a greater measure of European unity within a framework of Atlantic unity, as long as such restrictive measures as regional Customs Unions are ruled out. A great responsibility rests on Britain. It behoves us to proceed with all those measures which strengthen the solidarity of Europe. There is no place in Europe, and more than in S.H.A.P.E. (General Eisenhower's example might well be followed) for narrow, nationalistic policies. There is a big place—in some countries an empty place—waiting to be filled by men and women of European stature. If N.A.T.O. becomes the central authority for deciding political and strategic policies to be carried out jointly by the Atlantic Community, there is a rôle for O.E.E.C. and the Council of Europe, because the whole operation can only be carried out successfully if Europe exists with the maximum unity. There is a danger that we return to the chaos and restrictions of the 'thirties. Self-interest and tradition should compel us to come close to Europe with positive policies. Our re-armament record stands second to none; our determination to secure our own house in order is an example to the world. It remains for us to convince both Europe and North America that Britain's foreign policy is keyed to the responsibilities we have in fact undertaken. Will Mr. Eden supply the magic of leadership?

(Mr. Kenneth Lindsay, formerly Member of Parliament for the Combined English Universities and now the Chairman of the British Committee of the European College at Bruges, attended the ninth session of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon in February.)

NATIONALISM IN THE GOLD COAST—II

BY ASA BRIGGS

THE victory of the Convention People's Party at the elections of February 1951 ushered in a new period in the history of Gold Coast nationalism. The "prison graduates" became ministers in an Executive Council, which they were able to control. Kwame Nkrumah, Permanent Leader of the Party, became Leader of Government Business in the Legislative Assembly as well; Gbedemah, who had been one of the chief architects of party organization, became Minister of Health and Labour; Kojo Botsio, the third member of the inner circle, became Minister of Education and Social Welfare. From February 1951 onwards these men and their colleagues were judged by the politically articulate sections of the public not only on the basis of what they said concerning self-government but also on the results of their actions as ministers in charge of policy-making and administration.

There was something ironical about the C.P.P. leaders managing a constitution which they had dismissed as "bogus and fraudulent" while their political opponents, many of whom had sat on the Coussey Committee, were left out in the cold. The main consequence of the overwhelming electoral success of the C.P.P. and the formation of a party-dominated Executive Council was a switch-over in tactics between "ins" and "outs". While Dr. Nkrumah continued to try out the Constitution "experimentally" Dr. Danquah, the leader of the United Gold Coast Convention, who had sat on the Coussey Committee, moved a motion in the Assembly in April 1951 that a select committee should be set up to prepare the basis of a new Constitution, which would establish the Gold Coast as a fully self-governing Dominion within the Commonwealth. His motion was overwhelmingly defeated by 65 votes to six. The C.P.P. has retained the political initiative ever since, and has managed a Constitution, which it has never admired, in the hope that if it acts responsibly, the Constitution will eventually be changed. As Kwesi Plange, the able Ministerial Secretary to the Ministry of Local Government, put it: "In giving a trial to the new Constitution, we are aware of the great challenge that we have accepted; we are, as it were, standing at the bar of world opinion, and we assure the Secretary of State for the Colonies that we will prove ourselves not only capable to carry whatever burden this new constitution imposes, but that we are ready to assume greater responsi-

bilities in the administration of our country."

The main defect of the present Constitution, from a nationalist standpoint, is the presence in the Executive Council of three ex-officio members, who are all white. The Chief Secretary manages the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs. He is in charge of political administration, broadcasting, police, and public relations. The Ministers of Justice and Finance direct other key departments. Although there is evidence that during the last year the three ex-officio members have worked loyally with their C.P.P. colleagues in the Executive Council and, having expressed a point of view, have never over-ruled the African majority, their continued presence makes the Executive Council something less than a cabinet. This remains true although Dr. Nkrumah has recently been given the title of Prime Minister.

There are other defects too. Relations between ministers and the heads of departments, permanent secretaries, schooled in a colonial nursery, where there was little clear distinction between policy-making and administration, are bound to cause momentary frictions and frustrations. Many of the ministers are young and politically inexperienced; the permanent secretaries and the other high-grade civil servants are old and mellowed by experience. In any country such a situation would cause complications; in a colony it is made more serious by the fact that the ministers are African nationalists and the civil servants European. The ministers, for political reasons, must work quickly to produce "visible results"; the civil servants have learnt the advantages of caution, and some of them undoubtedly continue to feel a dual responsibility, which makes them anxious to check precipitate ministerial action which they realize will lead to serious difficulties. Since 1951 relations between ministers and really top-grade civil servants have usually been good, but further down in the departments and out in the districts there are still administrators who cling to the ideals of sound administration as they have been taught them, rather than adjust themselves to a situation, where it becomes their duty to administer policies, for which they may feel little sympathy.

The worst possible policy for administrators to adopt in face of a powerful nationalist movement is to retreat into a good-natured paternalism. Such paternalism widens the gap between politicians and administrators, and pours oil on to the flames of popular feeling in the country. Good relations depend on a sense of mutual trust and an ideal of service. There must be no hint of an elaborate and subtle manoeuvre to by-pass nationalism by offering "good government" at a cheap price. A sense of partnership and constant tact count for most. The tact necessary is shown by the original decision of the C.P.P. after taking office not to allow "fraternization" between party members in the Executive Council and European officials "except on purely official

occasions." Although such a directive appears frigid and austere, it has political roots, which stretch deep into the soil of the nationalist movement.

There is one reason above all why the C.P.P. must take particular care to manage the Constitution without too much enthusiasm and attempt to replace it by a better one from the nationalist point of view. The party has enemies who talk constantly of the "sweets of office" and associate power with patronage and positive policy-making with nationalist betrayal. The level of political controversy in the Gold Coast is not always pitched high. There is considerable personal vituperation and much over-candid press comment. These are features, which can be noted in any newly-developing democracy, and are in no sense a special product of the Gold Coast, but they do affect the atmosphere in which criticism is formulated and the administration attacked.

The political groups in the Gold Coast, other than the C.P.P., are still anxious to regain the initiative in the nationalist movement. Very recently, for instance, in January 1952, the U.G.C.C. has produced a seven point scheme "for Gold Coast liberation." It repeats the U.G.C.C.'s version of the history of the Gold Coast nationalist movement in recent years, describes the founding of the C.P.P. by Kwame Nkrumah as "an act of sabotage" and reiterates the demand for a national emergency council, representative of all informed sections of Gold Coast opinion, to make a joint declaration of readiness for dominion status. It goes on to suggest that an interim constituent assembly should be summoned at once to prepare a complete and practicable scheme for self-government and to settle with a special constitutional commissioner sent out from the United Kingdom the exact details of a transfer of power.

The seven-point programme bears all the marks of a party out of office and seeking to repair its fortunes by dramatic gestures rather than by building an efficient party machine, which will rival that of the C.P.P. The U.G.C.C. has regained some of its lost ground recently in certain parts of the country, particularly in Accra itself, but it is in no position to challenge the political supremacy of its far better-organized rival. It is in any case handicapped in working out its strategy by a curiously narrow and dogmatic belief that "the colonial struggle", in which it believes quite as firmly as does the C.P.P., can only be won by a united front organization, that political parties put party first and country second, and allow the hated "imperialist" to continue to rule. The gulf between the U.G.C.C. and the C.P.P. has grown wider in recent months, as the C.P.P. leadership has become more entrenched and the U.G.C.C. leadership more anxious to acquire power itself. Indeed the real basis of division between the C.P.P. and the U.G.C.C. is the question of leadership. Other issues, like the remembrance of things past and the con-

tinued difference of outlook on methods in politics, merely provide the respective leaders with sticks with which they can beat each other. Yet however dramatically the U.G.C.C. stages its gestures and however opportunist it becomes in its tactics, it will still remain a group of leaders without followers, until it builds up an effective party organization.

A more serious challenge to the C.P.P. comes from some of its own supporters. Any mass party, based on a small centralized leadership must inevitably face some difficulties in maintaining smooth relations between party officials and rank and file, and in the long run in maintaining smooth relations between its leaders. In December 1951 there was a spectacular series of resignations from the party leadership, three men resigning including Dzewu, the Deputy Chairman, and Nyemitei the Secretary. Both men were foundation members of the Youth Study Group, which had provided the nucleus of the C.P.P.; both were respected personalities, who were known to be zealous advocates of "Self-Government Now." Among their grievances against the party leadership were the delay in achieving self-government, "unnecessary fraternization of African ministers with Europeans at sherry parties" and the Government's attitude to the Lidbury Report, which deals with the future organization of the Gold Coast service. There were other reasons too, more specifically concerned with internal party organization and problems. Both Dzewu and Nyemitei expressed a desire to remain "floor members" of the party, as did Nartey, a local organizer, who went so far as to say that he was resigning not only because of "current irregularities" existing in the party, but because "he feared that the fate which Mussolini and Hitler suffered from the masses whom they led might befall him also when the masses of the Gold Coast woke up from the delusion under which they were now." It was a sign of the power of the C.P.P. as a party that none of these three men, who were obviously disgruntled and on bad terms with the party leaders in the Assembly, actually went so far as to resign from the C.P.P. It was an even more eloquent sign when several days later they all three withdrew their letters of resignation, and pledged their continued loyalty to the party. The C.P.P. had emerged yet again as a force against which single individuals found it difficult to contend. There may be further party divisions in the future, and there will certainly be a continued murmuring on the left and among the new "young men," who begin to take their place in Gold Coast politics, but there will be no deep party split, unless alternative leaders within the C.P.P. can emerge, who will not only eclipse the political appeal of Nkrumah, Botsio and Gbedemah to the masses of their countrymen, but will also prove capable of building up a rival machine. Disgruntled politicians outside may hope for a split in the C.P.P., but such a hope, even from the standpoint of their own self-

terest as nationalists seems a rather dubious one.

The real challenge to the C.P.P. at the present time comes not from alternative parties or groups of politicians, but from the danger of apathy in the general population, unless some of its election promises are realized. Such apathy would affect all sections of the nationalist movement and would in time produce an atmosphere in which disillusionment might well turn into irresponsible extremism. The other possible alternative development might be a diminution of the power of the politician and an increase in the prestige of the Chief, the traditional authority, but such a consequence would run counter to many social and economic currents in the Gold Coast, which have got little to do with politics as such. There can be no return to the forms of chieftaincy as it existed in the past without a regression in the economic unification and activity of the country. Most sections of the community, including influential sections in the C.P.P. believe that chieftaincy still has an important part to play in the life of the Gold Coast, but the rôle that they cast for it is a cultural and spiritual rather than a political one.

So far there are no signs of widespread apathy, and the C.P.P. continues to afford what is always referred to in the Gold Coast as a "dynamic leadership". The decisions of the C.P.P. provide the key to the shape of the immediate future. Its leaders realize that in the last resort their strength depends not upon their large majority in the Legislative Assembly or their control of the Executive Council, but in their influence with the public outside. The enthusiasm of the crowd, which meets in the Arena in Accra to cheer the party leaders and listen to their pronouncements, and of the village crowds, which still remain faithful to their red, white and green flag, ensures the perpetuation of C.P.P. influence. It is the C.P.P., pledged to "Self-Government Now," which will decide the next step in the road of constitutional advance, and not the ineffective opposition in the Assembly and in the country. As Aseley Hayford, the Minister of Agriculture, put it in his speech to the Assembly during the debate on Dr. Danquah's proposals in April 1951: "The hand of the Convention People's Party clock can never be turned back, not after the hour has struck for freedom, for liberty, for self-respect and for self-determination. It is a clock which is wound by the masses of the country."

Dynamic leadership involves intelligent tactics on the part of the party managers and continued enthusiasm on the part of the rank and file. Sometimes the rank and file needs restraining rather than encouraging; sometimes it chafes impatiently at what it regards as unnecessary delay. There are signs of intelligent leadership on the part of the men who make the effective decisions, and there is a general recognition that Nkrumah was right when he recently said—"when we have developed the party system fairly well and tried it for some time, we are sure that

when we ask the British to set us free, they will have no objection."

It is in this ultimate trust that the British will accommodate the Gold Coast Constitution to the demands of a popular nationalism that the C.P.P. pins its hopes of "self-government now." There are signs that important constitutional changes are on the way, and that they will not be secured by a "smash-and-grab raid" but by a sober understanding between Executive Council, Governor and Colonial Office. Until constitutional changes are made there can be no politics of standstill in the Gold Coast, and all political issues, from housing and town-planning to the price of cocoa and the future of the surplus of the Cocoa Marketing Board, will be related to the central problem of the next constitutional step ahead.

In ensuring that such a step is taken, the present leaders of Gold Coast nationalism must take care that while they make their constitutional understandings with the British authorities quietly and without undue fuss, they continue to retain the support of their less privileged and less well-informed party members. They must continue to talk the language which they have spoken so eloquently for the last three years. In his New Year message, Dr. Nkrumah showed that if he is now pre-occupied with tasks of government, he can still talk in the way which made him such a popular favourite in the country at large. "The C.P.P.," he said, "is now like an army in the field after winning battles. What it now wants is a conclusive victory. As in an army, therefore, the general must deploy his men well, have the necessary reconnaissance done, and when he sees his opportunity, let his men strike with all vigour to victory."

There can only be one end to a nationalist movement—victory—even if the fruits of victory are thought to be illusory, like tempting fruit on a tree which disappears at the touch of the hand, there can be no retreat once the march towards victory has begun. It was the conservative Dr. Busia, distrusted by the C.P.P., who said in the Chamber, with reference to British reluctance to accept in its fullness the implications of the demand for self-government: "We in this country, as I understand it, have been saying to Britain: 'You may be a good benefactor, you may know what is good for us; you may know what to do for us, but we demand the right to tell you what we want.' That seems to me to be democracy." Once this conviction has acquired roots, it cannot be blasted away. The C.P.P. has already made sure that it has acquired such roots in the Gold Coast.

(The first part of the article was published in the March issue of THE FORTNIGHTLY.)

AFRICAN NATIONALISM

SOME COMMENTS

To the March 1952 issue of THE FORTNIGHTLY Sir Charles Dundas, formerly Governor of Uganda, contributed the article "African Nationalism" and concluded at "... if we anticipate the emergence of a number of African nations we have good reason to hope that they will be less predatory than the nations of other continents have been; on the contrary they might be more so, being young and inexperienced and less remote in time from the state of barbarity. It is perhaps not too much to say that the only way of escape from such a dismal fate lies in racial or continental union, as is coming to be recognized as the panacea for the age-old ills of Europe. It is not impossible that Africans should begin at the point which we at long last are approaching. Wisely guided they start on a new era with all the advantages and free of the trammels of the old world ... It is equally possible that they may also skip the painful stages of social development through which Europeans have passed and still are passing, that they may go direct from the tribal to the racial or continental level of human association, and skip the national grouping."

The first part of Mr. Asa Briggs' article "Nationalism in the Gold Coast", discussing the events leading up to the elections under the new Constitution in February 1946, also appeared in the last number.

It is true that African nationalism everywhere south of the Sahara is part of the world-wide revolt of the coloured against the white in which, as the authors of *Attitude to Africa* rightly pointed out, all men of colour are "emotionally involved". It is also true that Dr. Krumah and other West African leaders, in criticizing South African policies, are beginning to sound the pan-African drum, though as yet intermittently and with a cautious beat. We must, however, be careful not to over-estimate the potentialities of this new factor in African affairs. The lack of means of communication, both physical and mental, the vastness of Africa itself, its pre-European history of universal inter-tribal warfare (for memories are long in illiterate societies), and its post-settlement history within colonial boundaries are all powerful diversifying influences.

In British West Africa nationalists are concentrating on building their artificially created colonies into independent nations and that, for better or for worse, is what they will become. There is at present no unity of feeling between Nigerians and Gold Coasters and, since there is no common Imperialist oppressor, I can see no reason why it should develop. France and Belgium are busy producing black Frenchmen and

Belgians, communication between their peoples and those of British Africa is, in most areas, meagre, and the tendencies are again towards diversity of culture and destiny. There is an emotional appeal for West Africans at present in championing the oppressed in South Africa, but I doubt if it will ever, and at least some West Africans agree with me, develop into a practical and effective crusade.

Sir Charles Dundas is thinking more of a pan-Africanism rising in the East and South from unresolved racial conflicts. The movement has begun in Central and South Africa in the All African Congress of the Union and the Congresses of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, and if these achieve international cohesion it may become powerful, but the obstacles, starting with the conservative parochialism of the people and ending with the strength of European resistance, are formidable. It is not, however, to be assumed that in Central Africa, and even less so in East Africa, racial conflicts will remain unresolved. Every thinking person, from Sir Godfrey Huggins to the African leaders in Kenya, who have persuaded the European leaders to form with them the Kenya Citizens' Union, knows that the only possible solution everywhere is inter-racial partnership. In some territories this policy may fail, but in others it may be reasonably successful and everywhere it is being developed on a territorial basis to turn people, not into good Africans and good Europeans, but into good Kenyans or good Tanganyikans, and the greater its success the less will be the motive for pan-Africanism. If pan-Africanism ever does become an effective force it will be born of success, failure and may well die in chaos and bloodshed. To speak of it, as Sir Charles does, as an abstract ideal regardless of European interests, is to disregard the facts. If the Europeans ever do go, even from South Africa, the only spur to pan-Africanism will go with them. By the time the forces making for territorial nationalism will have done their work. Mere colour in a continent with no other unity whatever will not do any more than it did for Europe when Rome fell, prevail against the harsher claims of more local patriotisms.

KENNETH BRADLEY,

Under-Secretary Gold Coast 1946-1949, editor of Coronet and author of The Diary of a District Officer.

* * * *

In British West Africa the policy of self-government is well understood. In South Africa the policy of *Apartheid* aims at the separate development of the Bantu in strict separation from the Whites. It is, at first sight, remarkable that two such diverse policies can be applied to people of common race. Such policies reflect the history of the territories.

ries concerned. The European cannot regard West Africa as his home, and there is therefore, no permanent clash of interests. In South Africa, 250,000 Whites live side by side with about eight million Blacks; both rightly regard the Union as their own permanent home. It is not surprising that the Whites there feel the need to safeguard their future against absorption into a mixed 'coloured' race. Dr. Malan certainly has the support of most white South Africans for his *Apartheid* policy, and he is slowly gaining support in the Rhodesias.

Opinion on these two diverse policies varies. Some regard British policy in West Africa as the height of irresponsibility; others regard *apartheid* as an immoral attempt, prompted by fear, to maintain White supremacy in the Union. Both Governments have the right to direct their own affairs without external interference.

The situation is so complex, and the policies so diverse, that any attempt to foresee the future must be speculative. I imagine that Sir Charles Dundas would readily admit this. But it would be a mistake to assume too readily that Bantu nationalism can be given political expression. 'Nationalism' has a meaning in Nigeria and the Gold Coast, where its political expression is possible. The word has little political meaning for the Bantu in South or East Africa. The pressure of the colour bar may be expected to make the Bantu more aware of their common race, but racialism without political expression can hardly be termed nationalism.

Continental union "as is coming to be recognized as the panacea for the age-old ills of Europe" may, in theory, be a "way of escape". But it remains in Europe, in spite of the Russian threat, very much of a theory. And in Africa, where there are at least six great Bantu tribal groups and several smaller groups, among whom co-operation is virtually non-existent, and tribal and faction fights all too common (see recent press reports of the Newclare riots), continental union is even more of a theory. It is, indeed, as misleading to speak of the 'Bantu in Africa' as it is to speak of the 'Europeans in Europe'.

It may well be that *Apartheid* will, in future years, be regarded as an unfortunate experiment. In the Union, Black and White interests are already intimately involved: more than one-fifth of the Bantu are tribalized as permanent town dwellers: the inadequacy of the native services: industrialization and the system of migrant labour: the number of mixed-marriages and the multi-racial nature of society—all these factors, and many more, indicate that *Apartheid* is too academic a policy. That, however, is South Africa's problem, and she will not be helped by unconsidered and uninformed criticism from overseas.

In the Rhodesias and East Africa, in sharp contrast to West and South Africa, there is no clearly defined native policy. In these territories the emphasis is meanwhile placed upon furthering the social and economic

development of the non-European. In the long run this may prove to be the wiser policy.

H. H. E. PEACOCK.

The Rev. H. H. E. Peacock was a member of the staff of St. John's College, Johannesburg, from 1936 to 1943. He then worked as a parish priest in Springs and Johannesburg until 1951 and is now on the staff of Bedford School.

* * * *

Starting from the undeniable thesis that African nationalism is racial and continental, Sir Charles Dundas speculates on the chances there are that the Bantu may skip the painful stages of European nationalism and form a single pan-African group. He admits that there is no reason why the rising African nations (whose boundaries as he says, need not, and probably will not, correspond to those of the present colonies) should be less predatory than the European. On the other hand, if they could begin at the point which we are at last approaching, then such a development, difficult as it is to imagine, would be of enormous benefit to themselves and to the rest of mankind.

In making a distinction between the east and west coasts of Africa Sir Charles Dundas does not mention one point of difference which might be important. Whereas the West African *évolué* is a product of European civilization, many progressive and influential East Africans are orientals whose religion is Islam and who respect Arabic culture much more than anything they have yet seen of the west. And since the majority of Moslems are homogeneously concentrated on the coast we may as well find that East African nationalism not only differs from West African but also within itself contains two separate and perhaps irreconcilable tendencies, one towards the east and the other towards the west. This may be typical of many other divergencies.

But however it may vary in detail, African nationalism is everywhere on the march. Apart from the natural desire of every adult person to be freed from paternalism and foreign rule its chief ingredient is the colour complex, which provides the thread of unity that runs through the whole continent and far beyond. Against this 'thinking with the blood,' arguments based on practical grounds like finance and economics are unavailing. It is a waste of breath to try to convince a dyed-in-the-wool nationalist that complete self-government without material resources is illusory and temporary, and that in this wicked world independence and weakness do not go together, since the withdrawal of one power only means the substitution, in some form, of another. It is to be hoped that after receiving self-government these young nations will see that it is to their advantage to remain within the empire. An association of this

kind, based on a common allegiance, is easier to imagine than the unity envisaged by Sir Charles Dundas, at least in any foreseeable time.

The emergence of nationalism on the Gold Coast, on the other hand, as described by Mr. Asa Briggs, has the elements not of harmony, but of friction and rivalry. The efficient party machine, the play on ignorance and backwardness, the bogey responsible for all social, political and financial ills, the glorification into martyrdom of a short spell in prison, the flags, the slogans and the songs, the 'fraternal' salute—have we not seen all this before? And can we not predict with mathematical accuracy what the next steps will be, when the restraining hand is removed and provided no one else intervenes? If present trends continue what must follow is the suppression of criticism as 'traitorous', the deification of a leader and finally the external adventure, the 'liberation' of neighbouring States. Then some sort of unification might be achieved, not by free agreement, but by the absorption of the weak by the strong. The only remedy for the corrupting influence of power on the Gold Coast would be the growth of an inexpugnable opposition, but of this there is at present no sign.

ANTHONY SILLERY,
*formerly Resident Commissioner for the Protectorate
of Bechuanaland and now secretary of the Taylor
Institution, Oxford.*

* * * *

In looking at nationalism in Africa to-day one is constantly reminded of the history of nationalism in India: the most successful of all such movements within the British Commonwealth and—for both good and ill—one of the outstanding political forces of our time. In India British Governments showed themselves unable either to master or fully to understand the force of nationalism, with the result that the successive constitutional changes they introduced were inadequate and always came too late to satisfy the nationalists' demands. The same thing, as Mr. Briggs reminds us, happened on the Gold Coast in 1946. It has been a great misfortune for the British Commonwealth that—largely because of the historic administrative division between India and the Colonial Empire—so few men have served in Africa with a first-hand knowledge of the problems of India behind them.

The lessons of the Indian struggle for independence are certainly not lost on nationalists elsewhere in the world. Sir Charles Dundas draws attention to the emergence of the idea of "Bantustan", a state to include all the Bantu peoples of Africa. The notion may sound far-fetched and, in its literal sense, incapable of fulfilment. Yet it ought not to be dismissed as beyond the bounds of possibility. Pakistan itself originated as

the obscure idea of some Indian students at Cambridge. But little more than a dozen years after the plan was first put forward it had become the leading political objective of a majority of the Moslems of India.

This is not to suggest that the circumstances of modern African nationalism are like those of India; they are as different as Africans are from Indians. "Bantustan", if it becomes a serious political force would have a far more formidable opposition to meet than Pakistan ever had. As Sir Charles Dundas points out, it is itself a logical, though ironical, consequence of the policy of *Apartheid* pursued by the present Government of the Union of South Africa. That Government would certainly put every obstacle they could in the way of this dangerous project for it represents what the Nationalist party most of all fear—a threat to the European domination of southern Africa.

One matter that Sir Charles Dundas does not discuss, which may have the effect of slowing up the development of pan-African movements of this kind, is the state of communications. The railways of Africa form as yet a primitive system, looked at from the point of view of the continent as a whole—more primitive than those of Russia in 1917 or of India in 1947; nor has Africa the great navigable waterways of China. The development of air transport has to some extent offset these disadvantages. But it remains true that very few African territories can yet be said to be unified in an economic sense, and inter-territorial communication is poor, where it exists at all. In these circumstances, though a superficial nationalism may emerge quickly, the growth of true nationalism, based on a real sense of common aims and needs, must inevitably be slower and very much more difficult.

JACK SIMMONS,

*Professor of History, University College, Leicester, and
author of From Empire to Commonwealth: Principles of
British Imperial Government.*

GAME OR BEEF IN KENYA

BY S. R. CLELAND SCOTT

IN many ways the preservation of wild life is almost an international question since every European or white nation has many ardent devotees of game. It so happens that the last real stronghold of game in Africa lies in British colonial territory. I am fully aware that quite a lot of game is to be found in the Kruger National Park, at Hluhluwe in Natal, and in the Parc Nationale Albert since I know all these parks, but in none is there the quantity or the variety that there is in Kenya—still. The Belgian Congo contains great herds of buffalo and elephant but little else, while Angola and Portuguese East have a fair variety of game, as have French Equatorial, N. Rhodesia and the Sudan. Tanganyika, that ward of the UN, used to contain even more game than Kenya but this is no longer so. First there was a mistaken belief that by butchering—there is no other word for what took place—the game the various types of tsetse flies would be wiped out or their advance halted but mercifully this policy has been abandoned. The second factor was the organized slaughter by Africans, who did not even have to possess licences, to feed not only themselves and their friends but to make money by the sale of meat.

In Kenya game is gradually being pushed back into smaller and smaller areas, besides being slowly reduced. Much of this reduction is done by control officers of the game department who operate mainly against elephant and the carnivorae. This department knows perfectly well that unless it has public sympathy it will get little co-operation for game preservation; consequently it often has to kill game that it would far sooner keep alive. In fact, except for a few species of small antelope, game in and around the settled areas has little chance of survival, save on a few farms whose owners willingly suffer losses in beasts or crops purely for the pleasure of watching it between times. Most of the elephants killed annually are shot because they will persist in raiding banana plantations and maize gardens. All the same, the African often almost invites the elephant to enjoy better feeding by planting his crops right beside what he knows perfectly well are age old elephant "roads" to water. Then he is too indolent to make any form of worthwhile stockade round his crops, knowing full well that he has only to howl sufficiently loudly for a control officer to come and avenge his laziness. From early in this century Kenya has had two large game reserves

which also contain various tribes. No hunters are allowed therein but game department officers kill off the lions, leopards, hyenas, or elephant when they create havoc. After the last war two national parks were established, the 40-square-mile one just outside Nairobi, and the 7,000-square-mile one around the Tsavo river between Nairobi and Mombasa. These parks include portions of the old southern game reserve. In addition national reserves were gazetted. There is a most important difference between a national reserve and a national park. In the latter the interests of game are paramount; in the former if the interests of game and man conflict then those of man predominate, and the game has to suffer for its misdeeds though at times these are not more heinous than the eating of grass and the drinking of water.

Game by its very existence attracts hunters and tourists, both heavy spenders of the much desired dollar. Many a Kenya settler too was originally attracted to the country by the game. There is no doubt that hunters are gradually becoming less as time goes on and so the question of retaining a plentiful supply of game to be hunted is of lesser importance. Actually the *bona fide* sportsman, to use an overworked word, is always also a preservationist; he does game no harm since he shoots beasts past their prime as he is interested in good heads. I have noticed that most visiting hunters of all nationalities, but particularly Americans, are usually men in or past their fifties. Until then they have either been too busy amassing fortunes, or had not got the money when young to undertake a hunting *safari* which is by no means a cheap amusement. The days when the Briton, after being crossed in love, went to Africa to hunt dangerous game to restore his *amour propre* seem to have passed, or lack of money necessitates some other thrill nearer home. To-day the youth of most nations seem to prefer to take photographs rather than lives. This is most estimable since pictures interest almost anyone whereas trophies appeal to the fellow hunter only. Nevertheless the urge to hunt dangerous game is born in you and some people never lose it.

Bearing the above points in mind, are the ethics of game, apart from its present and future dollar earnings, more important than increased beef production? This query has arisen because the Kenya Government have decided to try to turn the nomadic Masai into useful rather than merely decorative members of society. They are of Nilotic origin and of all the tribes in East Africa have been least affected by the advance of civilization; in consequence they are least interested in questions of self-government. They have no desire for any form of uplift. In many ways one cannot help sympathizing with the Masai who are one of the few races content with life as it was. A few enter the police and the K.A.R., and take jobs as herdsman, but never any form of manual labour. They are quite happy to be left alone to continue their age-old

nomadic life tending their vast herds of cattle and flocks of sheep which they are loth to sell. Before the British reached that part of Africa they were greatly feared and roamed over vast areas. Particularly scared of them were the Wakikuyu, to-day the most politically conscious and precocious of all the tribes, besides being the best business men. The only tribes who disputed their superiority were the Kipsisgis and their near relatives the Samburu, also stockmen, not agriculturalists. In the old days some Masai lorded it in the Great Rift Valley and some in Laikipia. Other portions of the tribe inhabited the western slopes of the Mau, adjoining the Kipsisgis and stretching down to the plains bordering Tanganyika. Those using the Laikipia country, where I for a time had a stock farm, were persuaded to move from there and take up a 1,000 mile block of country to-day known as Masailand stretching south of the railway, not far from Nairobi, to the Tanganyika border east and north of Mount Kilimanjaro. This country on the whole is ill-watered and also contains the old southern game reserve.

The Masai are not hunters and regard game as a nuisance because it tramples and empties waterholes which otherwise would last their cattle longer. Similarly it eats grass around the larger water supplies and so again the Masai have to move owing to lack of grass. They consider that the wildbeeste, of which there are thousands when calving down, spoil the grazing and give their cattle a specific disease. The Masai are used to having to trek because of game, since before the European settled in Africa there was even more game, but in those days they dominated much of what is to-day large parts of Tanganyika. When lions raid their cattle the warriors although armed only with spears, swords and shields seldom fail to get their lion which is more than can be said for us with our modern high-powered rifles. Our hunts are individualistic affairs whereas theirs are communal hunts. They are not hunting for sport but partly from revenge and partly as an insurance against future raids. Each knows that the chances are that at least one man will be mauled, but, human nature being what it is, each hopes that it will not be him. In any case it is rare for a man to be killed outright since the lion is evidently not as instantly dangerous as a tiger—many maulees, less lucky than I was, die later from blood poisoning. Against this fact it must be borne in mind that the terrain of each species is totally different, and the lion has a great number of adversaries during his own attack. On the other hand many a Masai has killed a lion single-handed to prove his manhood.

In Tanganyika it is not only common game and lions and leopards that upset his beloved stock but elephant too. Some years ago I was hunting elephant in northern Tanganyika in a piece of country where the only liquid to be found lay in shallow pans or had to be dug for in sand and rivers; grass was comparatively plentiful as were the Masai cattle,

sheep and donkeys, the last for transporting their belongings when they had to seek pastures new. In one sand river the warriors had nightly to sit up over the excavated area and even then they often failed to keep off the equally determined huge herds of elephant. In addition to the species already mentioned, buffalo, eland, and kudu, with warthogs and impalla, all get rinderpest and spread this disease to the cattle.

Other tribes, mainly the agriculturalists, are now suffering from their own greed for money. Leopard skins were always worth fair sums but after 1939 the price of the pelts rose tremendously with the result that the Africans trapped and nearly exterminated the leopard population. Admittedly at times a few leopards deserved what came to them as they not only raided native sheep and goats but killed far more than they needed, up to 20 from a herd, when two would have been enough. The diet of leopards is small antelope and gazelle, warthogs, bush pig, monkeys and baboons. As the leopards got wiped out the bush pigs, baboons and monkeys increased rapidly so that native maize and potato crops suffered untold damage. The pigs and baboons became bolder and bolder, and have proved a far worse scourge than ever the leopards were, and do far more damage; they become extremely cunning about traps, drives, and even poison.

At one end of Masailand lies the Chyulu National Reserve abutting on the Tsavo Park and at the other end is the Amboselli National Reserve, with the old game reserve in between. Amboselli and its precincts is one of the greatest attractions in all Africa; it is unique in having hardly changed at all since we began to occupy (not conquer, mark you) East Africa. The area is open undulating plains and thorn scrub dotted with large acacia trees, thickets, a dried up lake, and a swamp or two; the game population is heavy and as it has always been reserve the game is remarkably amiable. Elephant saunter from thicket to thicket, rhino disport themselves on the dried up lake, lions loll about in the shade and herds of antelope, gazelle, zebra and giraffe graze unconcernedly. On the edge of this paradise the lower slopes of Kilimanjaro, Africa's highest mountain, start to rise until they reach over 19,000 feet at the top of the permanently snow-covered dome, making a perfect background for any photograph. Amidst the herds of game elegant Masai nonchalantly lean on their spears as they watch their herds.

The Masai of Kenya get along with the Masai of Tanganyika but evince no urge to get together at all seriously. They live mainly on a diet of milk mixed with blood which they obtain by shooting an arrow into the jugular veins of their cattle, and drawing off the required amount; they also eat beef and mutton but do not bother with game meat and their cereal requirements are low. Many of us are collectors of some sort, curios, pictures, money, or gems; with the Masai this urge

likes the form of owning more head of cattle than the next man, their quality being a matter of minor importance. Thus they retain beasts which would be much better sold and slaughtered in order to increase their social standing; in other words cattle have a snob value.

The Masai administration are totally uninterested in game preservation, and would like to see it banished from Masailand so that the Masai can produce beef in a much bigger way than they have done in the past. They are thus being encouraged to educate their children, wear more clothes instead of perfectly good skins and blankets and in effect to desire consumer goods. Once this is put over successfully the administration feel that the Masai will not only want to sell for a change, but will need to produce more and better bovines. In order to prevent the everlasting chasing of water and grass they are sinking boreholes, making dams, and erecting fences so that the grazing can be properly controlled; somehow I feel that it will be a long long time before the Masai submit to living in a miniature welfare state. The administration appear to be prepared to care nothing for what happens to the game, in order to achieve planned and scientific ranching. They aim to tie the different clans to regular locations by having numerous watering places.

The national parks administration are very naturally against game being decimated in the old game reserve for that would adversely effect both the Chyulu and Amboselli reserves. They consider that the Masai are perfectly happy as they are, and that it is better for them to see and occasionally meet tourists rather than be kept almost as museum pieces in strict seclusion. The Masai themselves, being on the whole rather anti-game-preservation, naturally do not understand the importance of dollars pouring into Kenya since these do not appear obviously to benefit them. The parks administration would like the Masai to agree to a small portion, say ten miles round Amboselli, to become park—not reserve—as when this unique piece of Africa would be safe to remain as it is for ever. To obviate any possibility of lions raiding there it would be necessary for no *bomas* (enclosures) to be within this area. This is not really a great deal to ask but it will need an astonishingly persuasive tongue to get the Masai to give up even one acre of their land; it must not be forgotten that they left Laikipia to oblige government. Many people nowadays have to stop doing something they have done for generations, something they do not fancy for the good of all, so perhaps the Masai might martyr themselves to this small extent. Many other African tribes have at last seen the folly of cultivating steep hillsides, or right to the river banks, leading to soil erosion. European farmers too have given up 'mining' their land by growing wheat year after year on the same piece of ground. As the Masai are being helped by increased watering facilities it is possible they may in time agree.

After a great deal of argument a compromise, moderately satisfactory

to all parties, has been achieved. It has been decided to throw open the old game reserve to controlled shooting while leaving a corridor between the Chyulu and Amboselli reserves. Any hunter will have to possess the normal full licence costing a resident £7 10s. 0d. and £75 in the case of a visitor. Permits will then be granted to *selected* hunters allowing them into the reserve. These special permits will be chargeable and the revenue from them will help finance more boreholes. Cheetah and lion will not be included in these special permits, which will be issued solely by the game department, for cheetah and lion are no longer to be found in the numbers that existed even a few years ago; in fact on a full licence you are allowed but one lion per year instead of four as before the war.

This controlled hunting will achieve a double purpose. It will gradually push game towards the corridor where it can trek back and forth between the two reserves while still remaining in a protected area. Simultaneously it will make the game gradually leave the ranching area as they are slowly developed. At the same time an additional hunting ground for dollar-bringing visitors will be provided.

In time it is hoped that the Masai will produce more and better bullocks for sale. At first these can go to the Kenya Meat Commission cold storage factory which will be able to hold 3,000 carcasses. If the quality is not good enough their beasts will be used for canning. In time it is possible, if all the various schemes come up to expectations, to export meat to Great Britain; but before this can happen Great Britain will have to relax the restrictions on imported beef once further progress is made against the rinderpest disease. While all this is taking place tourists and film companies can continue to watch and photograph game around Amboselli where the animals have already discovered that man can after all be harmless.

The whole of the country under discussion is within 150 miles of Kenya's capital Nairobi which to-day is less than 24 hours from London. Various air line operators and travel agents, especially those in the U.S.A., plan to run regular trips lasting but three weeks; in that time people can either have a short hunt, or else just tour and photograph in a country that is not so rule-ridden as any park is bound to be, in addition to enjoying camp life which is no longer even mildly rugged. Instead of going to Yorkshire or Scotland for grouse shooting people can dodge some of the winter and experience a *safari* in Rider Haggard's Africa with no greater difficulty or hardship than a trip to Brighton—without the crowds—would entail.

(In his own words, in the article "Travelling Through Africa" he contributed to the February 1951 number of THE FORTNIGHTLY, the author has "farmed, hunted, mined and been in business in Kenya for the last 30 years" and from there, as this article was awaiting publication, came the news of his death.)

THE FOURTH YEAR OF ISRAEL

BY NORMAN BENTWICH

LAST April the writer surveyed in THE FORTNIGHTLY the third year of Israel, and described the faith and energy with which the Jewish people were facing immense material problems and spiritual difficulties. The principle was to pile up the problems, and let the solutions take care of themselves. That attitude persists, but is being put to a severe test. In the fourth year of the State the growth of the population—by over 200,000 souls—has been even greater than in the third, and perhaps as a consequence the economic position has become more critical. It has been remarked that 1948, the year when the State was declared, was a period of military struggle, 1949 of political, 1950-1951 of economic, struggle. And it is likely that the last struggle will be continued for a decade. The belief is still strong in miracles, which, in Bernard Shaw's definition, are events which create faith. The belief is strong also in miracles, in the sense of faith which creates events. But while in the military and political sphere the faith could overcome all difficulties, the economic facts of the national life are more stubborn.

The most striking feature of the year 1951 was the vast immigration from oriental Jewish communities. Between 1949 and 1950, 60,000 Jews of the Yemen, almost the whole of the most ancient dispersion of the Children of Israel, dating back 2,500 years, were transported by air, operation Magic Carpet, to the Land. During the last year, nearly the whole of the larger community of Iraq, the next oldest of the dispersions, was similarly transported by the operation known as Ali Baba, or Ezra and Nehemiah. Over a hundred-thousand men, women and children came in this way, and have been settled in all parts of the country. In addition, another 100,000 were brought by sea and air, and the greater part of them were from the oriental lands and the Arabic-speaking communities. From Libya came 30,000, and as many from other countries, North-Africa, Egypt, Turkey and Persia. The rest were from countries of south-eastern Europe, and principally from Rumania.

For the first time in the history of Jewish immigration to the Bible land, the great majority were Asiatic and African, and not European, Jews. A few years ago these oriental communities constituted only about a quarter of the Jewish population. They already are more than one-third; and as their rate of natural increase is much greater than that of the western Jews, it is likely that soon they will be the actual majority of

the people of Israel. The change of the source of immigration is bound to make a fundamental difference in the economic and cultural life. For the oriental Jews are relatively backward, intellectually and culturally, and count few men and women with a modern education.

The State of Israel has approached this enormous problem of integration with courage and resolution. The greatest part of the immigrants are taken straight from the places of landing to the temporary working villages, known as *Maabarot*, which are constructed in all parts of the land. They are villages not of permanent homes, but of wood, aluminium huts and of tents, and, to a less extent, of prefabricated houses. The biggest are placed on the outskirts of the big towns, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and the smaller towns in Galilee, Tiberias and Safed. Others again are in the empty spaces of the Negev, that arid southern area which comprises more than half the territory of the little State. Beer sheva, which is the principal centre of the Negev, has grown in the last three years from a military post of 1,000 or 2,000 inhabitants to a bustling hustling township of nearly 20,000. The number of immigrants in the reception camps has diminished from 100,000 to between 30,000 and 40,000, while the number placed in the *Maabarot* has risen to 200,000. In the working villages the able-bodied men receive employment three or four days in the week, in afforestation and road-making, drainage work, the laying of water-pipes and other forms of unskilled labour. The fullest opportunity is given to the inhabitants of the villages to seek permanent work in industry or to fit themselves for permanent agricultural settlement. So the population is constantly shifting.

The Government of Israel adheres to the principle of the open door for every Jew who wishes to return and make his home in Israel. This is laid down by one of the first laws enacted by the Knesset, Israel's Parliament. But though there has been no declaration of a new policy, the Jewish Agency, which shares with the State the organization of the immigrants, announced early in 1952, that certain conditions of selectivity, such as health, would be applied to those coming from countries in which they were free to stay or move. The new conditions would not apply to Jewish communities in urgent need of rescue from oppression or the fear of oppression, such as these oriental dispersals of the Yemen and Iraq, and now perhaps of Persia and Tunis, but mark a check to the dogma of maximum admission in a minimum time.

One of the motives of the new trend in immigration is the grave economic position, which deteriorated seriously during the year. In February 1952, the Prime Minister, Mr. Ben Gurion, stressed the seriousness of the crisis. Israel has exhausted its slender reserve of foreign currency, and has growing difficulty in purchasing abroad the considerable proportion of food-stuffs and consumer goods which are required for the rapidly growing population. The Israel pound, which

as officially equivalent to two dollars 80 cents, slumped in the free market. A new economic policy is to be introduced, which comprises three different rates of exchange for the Israel pound, ranging from parity with the pound sterling—the old rate—to three to the pound sterling for investors from abroad. Moreover, further encouragement is to be given to private investment, and a resolute drive will be made to increase food production in Israel and to reduce the number of civil servants. The main tasks were to hold inflation, to import capital and to increase production. A minor task is retrenchment of public expenditure. One of the main efforts of the Government in checking inflation has been to increase taxation. The Government have hitherto had three annual budgets; the ordinary, which was borne entirely by the population of the country and covered all the normal expenditure; a military budget, which was partly secret, and partly borne by outside contributions, and a development budget, for settlement of the immigrants, agricultural and industrial development and housing, which was borne mainly by loans, external and internal, and the voluntary contributions of the Jewish communities in the world. The total amount of the ordinary and development budgets in the year 1951-1952 (which ends this month), was just short of two hundred million Israel pounds, as against a total of 120 million in the previous year. The ordinary budget has increased from 70 to 113 millions, and this year it includes an item of 38 millions for defence, which covers the larger part of the cost of the armed forces. The Prime Minister has announced that next year all the budgets must be balanced by taxation and external loans.

The Government will issue no more Treasury bills or land bonds, which are regarded as inflationary measures, and there will no longer be a secret part of military expenditure. To achieve the balance, the rates of income tax have been raised, and the methods of collection have been greatly improved, so that the revenue on this head during the current year was nearly double the amount of 1950/51. On the other hand, the customs revenue has not been increased in similar proportion, because the Government aim at a reduction of foreign imports, particularly of consumer and luxury goods. The expenditure on the social services has been roughly doubled. As an example, the Government contribution to education has risen from £4 million to £12 million, so as to enable the law of free, compulsory elementary schooling to be implemented.

The development budget, which totalled over £80 million, has been provided in part by an Israel bond issue, launched in the United States last summer, and yielding by the end of the year \$100 million, out of the planned \$500 million in three years. Other factors have been a grant-aid from the United States Government, partly for defence and partly for settlement of refugees, of about \$70 million; and a further release of the British Government of the frozen sterling balances of Palestine.

That last source is nearly exhausted, but negotiations have begun for loan from the British Government to Israel.

Meantime industrial development in Israel is making great strides. big Kaiser-Fraser American plant at Haifa for assembling motor-cars had turned out over 1,000 vehicles by the end of 1951; a shoe factory on a large scale at Jerusalem, established likewise with American capital, was producing for export; chemical factories, including a large installation for phosphate fertilizer, have been constructed. The beginning has been made with the development of the mineral wealth of the Negev, which is known to be rich in copper, manganese, iron-ore, phosphate rock, ceramic clays and mica. Then the potash plant at the southern end of the Dead Sea, which has been out of action since 1948, is to resume operation, and a road to carry the product to Beersheba is nearly complete. The most pressing need is the increase of food production, so that the country may be more independent of foreign imports. It requires a sustained effort to turn the new immigrants, who were mainly an urban population, into peasants.

During the last year there was a political crisis, and fresh elections for the Assembly (Knesset), the single parliamentary chamber, were held in the summer. The Coalition between the central Labour Party, *Mapai*, and the religious block, of four small parties, became unstuck owing to disagreement about religious education in the immigrants' camps and working villages. The electorate had nearly doubled since the first registration at the end of 1948, but the number of members remained 120. The results showed that the division of parties was much the same except that the two extremes, the left wing of Labour, *Mapam*, and the right wing Nationalists, *Herut*, who are the heirs of the old military *Irgun*, lost ground. On the other hand, the General Zionists, who are non-Socialist middle-class, gained considerably. And both the Communists and the Arab parties increased their membership from three to five. The Arabs, indeed, who had four members in the first Assembly, have now eight, two being in the combined Jewish-Arab Communist Party, and one in the left Labour opposition.

A fresh coalition had to be formed round the Central Labour Party, to which the chief ministers, Mr. Ben-Gurion, the Premier, Mr. Kaplan, the Minister of Finance, Mr. Sharett, Foreign Affairs, and Mrs. Gold Myerson, Labour and Public Works, belong. It was hoped to build a broader-based Coalition, which would include both the General Zionists and the left wing of Labour. That effort failed, and *Mapai* had again to unite with three of the four religious groups. One religious party and the small Progressive Party, which were formerly included in the Government, stood out, and the present coalition has a smaller majority in the Knesset. An agreement to disagree about the vexed religious question has been reached, and in this way it is hoped that the Government may

able to concentrate on radical economic and social changes.

The first Knesset ended its legislative activity by enacting a law which provides for equal rights of women. It makes radical changes in property rights and women's civil status in the courts. It does not, however, affect the law of marriage and divorce, which remains subject to the religious law. Nevertheless, important reforms in that law, with a view to removing evils which had not been tackled by the Mandatory Government, were included in amendments of the criminal code. To check child marriage it was made a punishable offence for any person to be concerned with marriage of a girl below the age of 17, and bigamy is made an offence for persons of all communities, even though their religious law allows the marriage of more than one wife.

The new Knesset has begun the consideration of three fundamental Bills. The law of nationality, which is the most important, contains certain basic principles; the right of every Jew entering Israel to acquire Israeli citizenship at once, and the principle of allowing double nationality of the inhabitants. The second Bill is concerned with a comprehensive system of national insurance, on the lines of the British Beveridge plan. It includes old age pensions and pensions for widows and orphans, maternity benefit, family allowances and workmen's compensation—but not health insurance. Most of these matters have been covered in the past by a voluntary system of the huge trade-union federation (*Histadruth*), which embraces well over one-half the adult population of Israel. It is now proposed to give the authority of the State and the supervision of ministries to these aspects of social security, and to extend the benefit to all workers. The third major Bill provides for the reorganization of the civil service and its recruitment by examination.

The relations with the Arab States, which are the crucial problem of Israel's foreign relations, have not progressed favourably during the last year. The murder last summer in Jerusalem of King Abdullah of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was a great blow to the efforts for understanding with that State, which includes the Arab areas of former Palestine. And the forlorn effort of the Conciliation Commission, appointed in 1949 by the United Nations, to help to bring about terms of peace, proved abortive after a long and wearisome debate at Paris. The Arabs would not meet the representatives of Israel round the table, and the indirect negotiations offered little hope of success.

The other crucial issue with the Arab States, the resettlement of the 100,000 Arab refugees from Palestine, was again a subject of prolonged debate at the last General Assembly of the United Nations. Some little progress can be recorded. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Refugees from Palestine in the Middle East submitted its proposals for the absorption of 150,000 of them in the Arab States in which the bulk of the refugees are sojourning, some in agricultural

and some in industrial enterprises. A sum of 250 million dollars would be required for a programme extending over three years. In the end a resolution was carried calling on the members of the United Nations to contribute the sum; and the Arab States were persuaded to co-operate. If the resolution is executed, the years of the "restless, resentful idleness" may come to an end, and a prospect will be opened of action to reintegrate the refugees in economic life.

Serious frontier incidents between Israel and Jordan and Israel and Syria engaged the attention during the year of the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations. They were at least adjusted, and the Mixed Armistice Commissions have carried on their work continuously with some effect. With the help of the United Nations officers who preside over the Commissions, it has been possible to prevent deterioration. But after three years none of the four armistice agreements has given place to a peace settlement. Nor has it been possible hitherto even to arrange for the use by teachers and students of the buildings of the Hebrew University and the Hospital on Mt. Scopus above Jerusalem, and that though the armistice agreement with Jordan provides for an Arab-Jewish committee to work out the details of their restoration to cultural uses.

We may note, however, two achievements during the year in the cultural sphere. A vast Congress Hall, which is being erected in the western outskirts of Jerusalem, to be a centre of international Zionist gatherings and international conferences generally, was sufficiently advanced to be the seat in August of the first Zionist Congress held in Jerusalem. That gathering had to reconsider the fundamental principles of Zionism in the relations of Israel to the dispersed Jewish communities. And lastly, the plans have been completed for the holding in Jerusalem in May of the first international scientific conference, of which the theme will be "Men's Effort Against the Desert." The conference is under the auspices of UNESCO, and will bring together scientists from many countries. It had been intended to follow it with the first international exhibition, in Jerusalem's "Palaces of the People." But that event is now postponed till 1953, which is also to mark the official celebration of the 3,000th year of Jerusalem, since it was made the capital of King David's Kingdom.

Some immediate retrenchment of immigration and of Government expenditure on social services may be imposed by "the lethal blow of facts." But the Government and the people of Israel are firm in their resolve that the Land of Israel shall be not only the home of every Jew who wants to enter it, but also the intellectual and spiritual centre of the Jewish people.

(Professor Bentwich has just returned from a further long visit to Israel.)

THE BLOODLESS REVOLUTION—I

BY J. H. HUIZINGA

IN present day England even the wealthiest must make do with a net income which—at least in fiscal theory—is at most some 12 to 15 times that of the coalminer; in 1900 when their fathers formed the *aristocratie dorée* of Edwardian society this differential lay somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000. That is the measure of the economic revolution which has come over Britain. And it is not only the multimillionaires in the city or the ducal landowners in the country who have seen their privileged position melt away in this manner. A similar fate has befallen the lesser ranks of the traditional ruling class, that "gentry" which, in the words of Hilaire Belloc, "has created the whole history of England up to our time." The banker, the industrialist or the landed proprietor who in 1900 had a pre-tax income of £25,000 representing a purchasing power some 340 times that of the miner of those days, now obtains no more than nine times the net income of the man in the mine. The top-ranking judge with his salary of £5,000 a year is only five times better off compared with a differential of approximately 70 in 1900. For the fieldmarshal or the permanent under-secretary of one of the great ministries the figure is now somewhere between three and 4.5. For the directors of the British Museum and the National Gallery it is just about three. For the moderately successful barrister, architect or doctor as well as the highest paid university-professor it is less than two and a half, for a university-trained teacher it is one and a half.

This radical levelling of incomes is not, of course, a specifically British phenomenon. In America, too, and in most European countries a similar compression of the social pyramid has reduced the economic distance between the different social classes to a fraction of what it was less than 50 years ago. There are several reasons, however, why the English form of this revolution which has extended over the entire western world, is of particular interest. And the most important of these are, first, that in England it has radically transformed the economic structure of a community whose social and political structure until very recent times still bore a distinctly aristocratic character, and, secondly, that it has compressed a social-economic pyramid which towered high above that of most other European countries. For nowhere in the democratic western world had the traditional ruling class of nobility and wealth retained such a firm hold on all the positions of power as in pre-revolutionary

Britain. Nowhere were the class-contrasts more striking. "An impassable gulf divided the Rich from the Poor . . . the Privileged and the People formed two nations, governed by different laws, influenced by different manners, with no thoughts or sympathies in common, with an innate inability of mutual comprehension." Thus it was still in the first years of our century, two generations after Disraeli had written these famous words. On the one side the nameless propertyless masses, the great unwashed, on the other side the gentry whose privileged position moved Robert Lowe to exclaim when addressing its representatives in the House of Commons in 1867: "You, the gentlemen of England, you with your ancestors behind you and your posterity before you—with your great estates, with your titles, with your honours, with your heavy stake in the wellbeing of this land, with an amount of material prosperity, happiness, dignity, and honour which you have enjoyed in the last 200 years, such as never before fell to the lot of any class in the world."

It was this grim contrast between the state of the two nations which had so forcefully impressed Hippolyte Taine during his journeyings in Victorian England: "*Ayez vingt mille livres de rente ici ou coupez-vous le cou,*" he wrote, "*voilà une idée qui me suit sans cess.*" To-day there is (in theory at least) not an Englishman living who still enjoys anything like that income. Six thousand pounds, worth less than a quarter of what this amount represented in Taine's day and thus less than ten per cent. of what he considered indispensable to make life worth living, is about the maximum that anyone can hope to retain. Indeed, revolution is not too big a word for such a drastic change. And yet, typically English, it has been carried through without any of its victims, "the gentlemen of England," having followed the Frenchman's advice or, what is more, having had the job done for them by the revolution's beneficiaries.

* * * * *

In the last five years, as Aneurin Bevan proudly exclaimed at the time of his resignation, we have carried out the greatest social reconstruction the world has ever seen. It is a theme which returns in most socialist speeches and writings. Thus the myth threatens to gain currency, that the day on which Labour took power in July 1945 marked the beginning of the bloodless revolution. In actual fact the progressive redistribution of the national income which until the turn of the century had always remained very unequally divided between "the classes and the masses," as they used to be called, had already begun some 40 years earlier. A few figures may suffice to show not only that this operation has been carried through in successive stages but also that its main instrument, the fiscal knife, has been wielded nearly all of the time by liberal and conservative governments. Take first of all the income tax. Till the end of the nineteenth century the State contented itself with a levy on even the highest incomes of no more than from two to three per cent. In 1913

his figure had risen to eight per cent., in 1919 to 51 per cent., in 1939 to 83 per cent., and in 1945 to 94 per cent. And there it has remained. A similar gradual progress characterizes the fiscal redistribution of property distinct from income. The means employed for this form of levelling, the death duties, were introduced in 1893 when the top range of estates were taxed at the rate of eight per cent. In 1909 this percentage was raised to 15 per cent., in 1914 to 20 per cent., in 1919 to 40 per cent., in 1930 to 50 per cent., and in 1940 to 65 per cent. Since then the socialists have merely carried the process a few steps further by raising the figure in 1946 to 75 per cent. and in 1949 to 80 per cent.

The fiscal knife, however, is only one of the weapons with which the bloodless revolution has been fought. If the economic distance between the classes and the masses has been so drastically reduced in the last 40 years that is, of course, also due to the vastly improved bargaining position which the latter have achieved through organization. And it is hardly necessary to say that the legislation which enabled them to do so was already complete long before their political representatives came into power. It is true, of course, that without their growing pressure in opposition the work would not have gone so far nor so quickly. What Joseph Chamberlain in his radical days said sarcastically of the Whigs applies equally to the attitude to the gentry of our days: "The Radicals lead the great popular movements and if they kindle national enthusiasm it is the prerogative of the great Whig noble to direct and guide and moderate the movement which he has done all in his power to prevent and discourage."

Likewise one may say that the socialists, once in power, have carried the levelling process further than the Tories would have done, using money- and price-policies as well as physical controls rather than the fiscal weapon to achieve their redistributive aims. Their own chancellor, however, has provided the best proof of the extent to which the process of "soaking the rich" had already gone even before Labour took over when in answer to a parliamentary question he supplied the following statistics on the economic decline of the "classes" since 1900 resulting from the rise in prices and taxation. According to these official figures a multi-millionaire with a money-income of £100,000 has seen his post-tax purchasing power decline from £91,700 in 1913 to £23,000 in 1928, £2,459 in 1945 and £2,097 in 1950. For an ordinary millionaire with an income of £50,000 the corresponding figures are £45,900 in 1913, £13,000 in 1928, £1,934 in 1945, £1,685 in 1950. For the successful businessman with an income of £10,000 they are £9,241, £3,769, £1,330 and £1,198. For a judge with £5,000 they are £4,708, £2,205, £921, £843. For a barrister or solicitor with £2,000 they are £1,925, £1,029, £493 and £468. The pre-tax money-incomes of these different categories have in many cases risen considerably since 1913. But even if the

lawyer of to-day should earn five times as much as his father in 1913, he would nonetheless have only something like half his father's real income. Again, if the high court judge of to-day should draw ten times as much as his father in 1913—in actual fact he gets exactly the same—he would nonetheless only be able to maintain a standard of living of one-third that of his father's.

True, even now and in spite of 40 years of levelling the economic distance between the wealthiest and the poorest is still quite considerable. The few very rich who in 1949 retained a post-tax income of more than £6,000 enjoyed a purchasing power some 40 to 46 times greater than that of the 1,113,000 persons who declared an income between £130 and £150. But their number, 86, is so small that one can hardly speak of a class. To a lesser extent the same applies to the 5,264 taxpayers who had post-tax incomes of between £4,000 and £6,000. For the overwhelming majority of "the classes and the masses" the gulf which separated them in Disraeli's time has now become so small that it could be better described as a shallow ditch. If one draws two dividing lines, one at the income-ceiling of £500 (taxfree in the case of a family with three children) to indicate—arbitrary and inexact as such divisions must necessarily remain—the frontier between the working class and the lower middle class, the other at the ceiling of £1,000 (after tax) as the border line between the lower middle class and the "gentry", the following picture emerges of this country's social-economic stratification. At the bottom of the pyramid a working class of 18,700,000 breadwinners, next a lower middle class comprising 1,551,000 taxpayers whose average is only 1.8 times better off than the average industrial wage-earner and for whose top layer the coefficient does not rise above 2.6; finally a "gentry" comprising 434,000 taxpayers for 78 per cent. of which the coefficient is on the average 3.6 and for 18 per cent. of which it is 6.9 while for the top layer of some 3,000 persons it reaches a figure of more than 11.

In the light of these figures one might well feel that this country has gone a long way towards the socialist ideal of the classless society. Yet the remarkable thing is that on the surface of life there is little visible evidence of the far-reaching levelling of incomes. The difference in style of living, not only between the classes and the masses, but also between the component parts of the classes still remains very striking. Whereas the income-structure of the British nation has undergone a truly revolutionary transformation since the beginning of the century, the social structure still largely presents the old picture of a pyramid whose top lives in a completely different world from that of its massive base.

There are several explanations for this contrast between the theory and the practice of fair shares. The first one is, of course, that in spite of their deserved reputation for social discipline the British, too, do not

ways render unto Cæsar what is Cæsar's. Dudley Seers estimates the amount of tax-evasion at several hundreds of millions a year. The revenue people themselves say no more about it than that there are some 80,000 to 100,000 taxpayers who have gone underground, mostly small traders. The second explanation of the lavish spending one sees going on all around one is doubtless that those who do so are in many cases drawing on capital. The third is that England, in contrast to America, does not tax capital gains except in so far as they arise out of some forms of landed property.

But if, therefore, some members of the well-to-do classes manage to escape the immediate effects of the bloodless revolution, the great majority has felt these effects only too painfully. And none more so than those sections of the "gentry" whose fate already filled Dean Inge with dire prebodings as early as 1926; the upper strata of the professional class whose members have for centuries associated on a basis of equality with the aristocracy of wealth and blood. "Even more to be regretted [than the decay of the old aristocracy]," he wrote, "is the doom of the professional aristocracy, a caste almost peculiar to this country. These families can often show longer and usually better pedigrees than the peerage, and the persistence of marked ability in many of them for several generations is the delight of the eugenicist. They are perhaps the best specimens of humanity to be found in any country in the world . . . yet they have no prospects except to be gradually harassed out of existence. The power will apparently be grasped by a new, highly privileged class, the aristocracy of labour . . . intelligent, energetic and intensely selfish." An illustration of the loss suffered by this class has already been given in the figures relating to the position of a high court judge. His salary is still the same as in 1913: £5,000 a year. His net purchasing power has declined from £4,708 in this basis-year to £843 in 1950.

It is probably true that in other countries, too, it is this class which has suffered most from the bloodless revolution. But in one respect their position, at least that of its upper ranks, threatens to be undermined even more in England than elsewhere; they can no longer give their children the same privileged education which they have received themselves and to which they partly owe their social position as fully accepted members of the traditional ruling class. Where is even the relatively highly paid high court judge with three sons, who retains a post-tax income of £2,554, to find the roughly £700 a year required to give them the gentleman's traditional education? Unless he has capital to draw on his children will have to go through life without the old school tie. And that means that his loss of economic status carries with it a certain loss of social status for his descendants.

* * * * *

When Lloyd George in 1909 set in motion the process of levelling he

characterized his famous budget as "a social and political revolution of the first magnitude." Eleven years later the French ambassador Cambon thought that the revolution had already been accomplished. "In the twenty years I have been here," he said to Winston Churchill in 1920, "I have witnessed a revolution more profound and searching than the French Revolution itself; the governing class has been almost entirely deprived of political power and to a very large extent of their property and estates." To-day the levelling process has been carried an immensely long way further with the result that the real income of by far the largest part of this "traditional ruling class" is now only a few times that of the average working man. But has this also involved, as Cambon thought, the loss of its political influence? Has the economic revolution of the last 40 years really brought about that far-reaching transformation of the social structure which Rosebery foresaw?

According to such widely different observers as Harold Laski, Hilaire Belloc and J. B. Priestley the contrary is true. "Our social structure," Laski wrote in 1932, "has remained largely unchanged since at least the middle of the 18th century." "Contemporary England," Belloc wrote in 1937, "is an aristocratic State, the only one in white civilization, aristocratic in the sense that its citizens are ordered, its laws made and administered, its customs preserved by a comparatively small governing class and in which such a social structure is found naturally by all its citizens." "Britain," Priestley wrote a year later, "bears no resemblance to a democracy, it is a plutocracy roughly disguised as an aristocracy. All our real government is done by the Right People." The allegation was certainly not unfounded, witness the fact that, according to Simon Haxey's study *Tory M.P.*, approximately one half of the parliamentary rulers of pre-war England were connected with the nobility, members of the "cousinhood", while in addition the overwhelming majority of them were surtax-payers.

It would seem, therefore, that Rosebery's prediction of 1909 has been only very partially fulfilled, that Cambon's diagnosis of 1920 has proved deceptive, in short, that the gentlemen-class, in spite of the progressive crumbling away of its economic position, has by no means disappeared from the scene as a social and political power. True, in 1945 this class at last lost its supremacy in parliament. But apart from the fact that its members remained strongly entrenched in other positions of power it also took them only six years to reconquer control at Westminster. Thus the political revolution of 1945 has no more liquidated their great influence than the economic revolution which started as early as 1909. In this sense Cambon was proved wrong. But that does not mean that those who ruled England up to 1945 and who are now again in power are the descendants of the aristocratic landowning families of the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth. What Cambon saw as the disappear-

ance of the traditional ruling class was in reality but its reincarnation, a process which has taken place over and over again in the history of this country where not blood but success, usually though not always measured in money, has always been the qualification for membership of the ruling class. Not that just any kind of money constituted an acceptable entrance fee; it had to be what Hilaire Belloc called "cooked money" in the sense that its owners had had it long enough to learn to adapt themselves to the aristocratic style of the blood. But only the style of this ruling class was hereditary. Its personnel has been constantly renewed and its economic basis re-inforced by the absorption of new generations of the socially successful possessing sufficient economic power really to be able to rule and sufficient understanding for the needs of the time to preserve the policy of this class from fossilization and thus safeguard its prestige.

When, therefore, Belloc says that "the gentry have created the whole history of England up to our time" and that pre-war England still remained an "aristocratic State", he refers to a very different system of government from that of the hereditary oligarchy, the closed shop, usually associated with the word aristocracy in its modern connotation. England has been an aristocracy only in the original Greek sense of the word, that is to say, in the sense that power has normally lain in the hands of that small class whose members, or at any rate their immediate ancestors, had carried away the biggest prizes in the struggle for existence and who might therefore be described—if one is prepared to identify success in a competitive society with social worth—as a natural *élite*. And if this *élite* has succeeded in perpetuating its rule long after every wider and lower strata of the social pyramid were admitted to the franchise and simultaneously greatly improved their relative economic position, the explanation is at least partly to be found in what Harold Laski called "the gentleman's instinctive knowledge of when compromise and concession are desirable; however much he may have opposed the wants of other classes, he has never so far challenged them as to threaten his own security. His genius for compromise and his capacity for absorption have given him control for 200 years of English history."

(The second part of Mr. Huizinga's article will be published in the May issue of THE FORTNIGHTLY.)

THE UNIVERSITY IN AMERICA

BY BARRY TRAPNELL

A BRITISH visitor to American universities soon finds a wide variety of important differences in educational theory and method between the two countries. After receiving the idea that a university education should be available economically to everyone and intellectually out-of-the-question for very few, he next meets, and probably reacts against, the rather lower academic standard and narrower conception of what university education should incorporate, which seem to be the inevitable consequences of so gigantic an enterprise. He finds that the courses of study are more directly applicable to subsequent employment, and that a larger proportion of students are unsuccessful for the degrees for which they are candidates, particularly doctors' degrees. He finds rather less contact between teacher and undergraduate; he finds a very different attitude towards sport. At the research-student level he finds less time is available to do research, to read well into his subject and to think, and a greater degree of supervision of his research by his director—all differences not apparently very significant or important, but which in fact, particularly where the sciences are concerned, are quite the reverse in relation to the suitability of the Ph.D. for a university career, and for industrial work.

Some of these differences are ascribable to intrinsic national differences. Thus, the question of selection of students is extremely difficult in a country as large as America. The ability of a candidate for graduate school from a small and relatively unknown college, of which there are very many, may for example bear no relation to his record at this college. In Britain, the ability of a candidate is far more easily assessable from his examination and school record, and it is possible, with relatively few exceptions, to give a degree to any accepted candidate. The American method, as entrance examinations are not felt to be practical, is to make entry fairly easy in order to give every reasonable candidate a chance to prove himself and to avoid a possibly wrong refusal of a candidate, and to prune as soon as is reasonably possible. Rather than wastage being something to criticize, it is a tribute to America that it is as low as it is, and that students unlikely to meet the degree requirements are not allowed to waste time, and hence self-confidence.

On the other hand, other differences, such as the greater mixing of

the sexes in American universities, are a matter of policy. Though this has been criticized on the particular ground that the fraternity-sorority system has led to an artificial, time-wasting, and even harmful forcing together of the sexes at a time when they could with more separation be getting on with university life far better, it seems unlikely that there will be any substantial change in the near future. It may be of some interest to mention that fraternity and sorority members, often numbering half the undergraduate body, are usually expected to have about one "date" a week, failure to date being regarded as a definite slur on their house.

No visitor to America can fail to praise the scale on which university education is planned and executed. With free instruction provided by the State universities, and the standard of entry lower than in Britain, few young men and women need be denied university training provided they are, if necessary, willing to support themselves by working during vacations and part-time during terms. It is commonly known that many achieve degrees in the United States by "working their way through." It is not so commonly known that the course requirements are such that this may be done without severe difficulty or severe detriment to the students' university life and work. It would be difficult in a class among whom some were supporting themselves and others were not, to distinguish between the two categories. One may quote the case of an undergraduate who worked 20 hours per week for Sears Roebuck, a large mail-order firm, during terms, earning thereby 17 dollars per week out of the 25 dollars necessary to support himself. To maintain himself during vacations and provide the necessary deficit from term time was not difficult.

Such an opening of university gates to a far wider extent than in Britain has led to a lowering of standards, and the American graduate is between a year and 18 months behind his British counterpart. But one cannot other than wonder that education to such a level is so widely accessible, and at the number receiving American degrees each year—in 1950, per head of population, some seven times as many as in Britain. At least one British authority has recently suggested that a primary factor in the superior American technological development is the overall superior training of its industrial staff. "Not only do we need to increase the output of the most highly trained persons, but we also need a general upgrading of the technical training of all our industrial manpower" (Sir Ewart Smith. *American Scientist*, April 1951). It does seem clear that by comparison the British policy in education is to concentrate more on standard than quantity. Though this policy probably produces a rather higher standard of leader it has implied that far less attention has been paid to the possible benefit to society from the education of large numbers who at present receive no university training. Such a policy may be questioned where international status is closely linked to techno-

logical efficiency and advancement. In addition there are signs that at least in the sciences British post-graduate courses produce a person too highly trained to enter easily the intellectually more restricted life of industry; a point which will be developed later.

It seems likely that American university education will continue to grow, as there is a narrower range of employment open in America to the person not holding a degree. For example, increasing numbers of large department stores require new assistants to hold a university degree, ward sisters in hospitals likewise now have to hold a degree in nursing education.

The next apparent difference is the number of unexpected possible fields of study presented to the undergraduate. Nearly all large American colleges have schools of journalism, commerce and business, political science and chemical engineering. Equally some subjects popular in British universities such as classics and philosophy are not strong in America. History is largely foreshortened to sociology and political science, courses in public speaking are offered, and in addition the number of undergraduates "majoring" in a given subject is likely to vary considerably over a matter of a few years, this being mainly due to predictions by various authorities as to what fields of employment are likely to be most open in the future. The value of a university is in the mind of most undergraduates and parents primarily the qualifications for employment which it provides, and the directly vocational aspect of course-work hence becomes the most important consideration of its life.

Subsidiary to this is that the undergraduate or graduate student is given less freedom to develop himself and his interests and capabilities than the British undergraduate has. To the American the mind is as much "a vessel to be filled" as "a fire to be kindled" and his education centres around the text book and lecture theatre. Even postgraduate students are required to take a certain quite heavy minimum number of lectures with attendance compulsory, and "cutting" a lecture is far less excusable than in England. Examinations are normally held twice a term, and various kinds of tests for undergraduates (which count towards classification of degrees) take place weekly. The student is really left little time to develop independence and quality of intellect and character. When it was suggested to several graduates and undergraduates that the system of yearly examinations with the lightest compulsion upon lecture attendance could add greatly to the freedom and possibilities of university life, they in general thought it too "idealistic" and that a year's work might too easily be vitiated through having a few "bad days" at examination time.

The idea that the primary function of education should be to develop in the student wisdom, soundness of judgment and a desire to know and

achieve the good life, and only the secondary function to equip him with certain factual knowledge to do a specialized job, is not often expressed in America. There is the idea in American life that such virtues come primarily from living life, and that their inculcation is not the job of the universities. In fact, any study of these things, or of the lessons to be learnt from literature, classics and history, may be regarded as a sign of unhappiness. This view is augmented by a firm belief in progress doctrines and hence in the innate superiority of the present and the practical over the past and philosophic. Sometimes, the prevailing vocationalism in education errs positively as well as by omission. A graduate student friend in journalism for example was given a low grade for an article admitted to be a thoughtful and careful analysis of a current political situation on the grounds that it was on too high a level to attract the average reader or to sell. He then proceeded to get a series of higher grades by writing further articles at a lower level.

Yet, in spite of being vocational, American education is aware of the dangers of over-specialization and, particularly in the field of science, it has been more successful than has British education in preventing the unfortunate results of too intense a concentration. This has been achieved mainly by allowing the student to attend lectures on a variety of subjects until he receives his bachelor's degree. This may be contrasted with the state of affairs in Britain where a fairly intense specialization starts after matriculation. But the possibility of widening the interests of the student, by immersing him in an atmosphere where influences outside his subject are brought to bear on him, is not much used in America. Games in Britain serve a useful function here, for the average British undergraduate is likely to play and enjoy at least one game. This not only brings him into natural contact with people of a wider variety of interests and background than any other of his activities is likely to do; it presents him with a good opportunity to learn the art of friendship with people whose energies are not directed towards ends the same as his own. In America the games programme is not so well adapted to serve these ends. More emphasis is placed on the importance of university teams, and the opportunity and encouragement for the average undergraduate to derive the advantages of playing a game are less. That an American could enjoy playing cricket (a game with which he had had no previous contact) in the Long Vacation at Cambridge is a tribute to our system of games.

The student entering the American graduate school with a bachelor's degree is, unlike his more advanced British counterpart, not ready to embark upon a course of pure research training, and in addition to his research he attends courses of lectures. As the doctor's degree is in both countries only three years distant from the bachelor's, it turns out that the American graduate student only spends about 18 months on research.

In order that this time should not be fruitless, and also because directors of research are keen to obtain publishable results, the American research-student is, by British standards, very closely supervised by his director, and occasionally not too sure in the early stages what the significance and aim of his research are. The results of this are clear—he becomes technically very reliable and well equipped. He does not feel he must produce and follow ideas of his own, nor does he develop a desire for independence in his work. Research does not become for him anything of a pilgrimage. All these points mean that the American research-student is not often suited to a university appointment or a career of self-directed research, although he is quite admirably suited to an industrial career, the more so as entering business has no intrinsic unattractiveness as it may have for his British counterpart.

The British research-student is given more freedom; he is left more to himself, and allowed to waste some time in order to gain self-reliance in research. He is expected to produce and follow at least some ideas of his own. He is likely to experience the pleasure of planning and executing his own work—research becomes something of a probing into mysteries for him. Industrial requirements mean that for scientists research projects are largely dictated by a profit motive, with a consequent lack of freedom, making such work less attractive than the more fundamental projects attacked by universities, and an industrial career is sometimes thought of as irksome and involving frustration. The Britisher with postgraduate experience is better suited to an academic career or one of self-directed research. As the number of such posts in Britain is relatively small two possibilities arise: a sometimes unwilling acceptance of an industrial post, or emigration to a country where more attractive opportunities present themselves. Each year Britain loses some highly trained men and women, mainly to the United States but also to Canada, where the National Research Council offers itself as a splendid way to emigration. At a time when scientists are admitted to be rare and valuable, such a movement must be regretted.

It seems that the postgraduate course in Britain has been developed on the assumption that the same conditions hold for science as for the humanities—that continuance of education beyond the B.A. stage implies a university career. Whereas in the humanities this is usually true, the main field of employment of the scientist with research training is industry. Perhaps the differing requirements of the university and of industry from its research workers calls for two separate kinds of research training.

At the faculty or staff level, the American has to make a far larger financial sacrifice than does the Briton by staying in university work. For example, a just graduated Ph.D. entering industry now commences at between 5,500 and 6,000 dollars per annum. A university demon-

strator or assistant lecturer may receive less than 4,000 dollars, and a full professor less than 7,000 dollars. This relative underpayment of staff would appear to have two roots. The first is that Federal money has not been made available to American universities as a whole; there is no American counterpart of the University Grants Committee, and the setting up of such a body would apparently be impossible as it would become an awkward political issue. The second is that although American philanthropy is considerable, with the universities receiving copious money from such sources, the philanthropy is more often directed towards the erection of buildings, and less often towards purely academic ends than in Britain.

In addition, the placing of ultimate authority in university matters in hands other than those of the staff means that the American faculty member feels himself less as being the university and more the hired hand of the university than does the Briton. Moreover, promotion, which is important if economic hardship is not to result, may reside in the hands of persons not in the American's department or field, who tend to judge his contribution to the university by the number of his publications. So the results of the quest for promotion are mobility of teachers from university to university, and the tendency of staff other than the most senior to plan research primarily in the light of rapidity of publication.

A survey of a large subject must suffer by having to generalize and describe overall impressions, when very many exceptions exist. But it would be wrong to close without urging those who may have the chance to visit American universities to take it, and observe all the differences at first hand, to see the attractive setting in which most American universities are situated, to experience the marvellous warmth of welcome extended to the outsider, and to breathe the refreshing air of American life.

(The author, who is a College Lecturer in Natural Science at Worcester College, Oxford, returned from America in September after a year's tenure of a Commonwealth Fund Fellowship. The universities he visited included Chicago, Harvard, Michigan, Northwestern, Pittsburgh and Princeton.)

GATHERING PALM

BY MARGARET STANLEY-WRENCH

Above the ditch, clogged with dregs of winter,
(Blackened leaf and grey, scorched ribs of fern,)
The osier wands lift up, golden or red,
Dry red, like blood, or the olive's passive green,
Rods, scourges to beat back winter's ragged fringes.
And up each stem, silver as coins poured out
Into a hand, the catkins cling, so soon
Fledged, golden as a swarm of drowsy bees
Dredged with pollen and dazzled by the sun.

O palm, the rod of triumph, gathered in
On this day, not yet spring, yet saved from winter,
In the thin honey of sunlight, under the cotton
Blue sky skimmed by rain, rinsed out and clean,
As we, processional, hold you, bend you crosswise,
Bring to our hearts remembrance and contrition.
How can we escape this pang of winter
Except by stretching, reaching up, desiring
The pliant bough of spring, golden, eternal?
Wand of Easter, studded with leaf and hope,
Dry red, like blood on hands wounded to take it,
Green as the tranquil olive of the hills,
Or silver, like coins spilt out across a hand,
Man's treachery that flowers into salvation.

VISUAL IMAGES

BY JOSHUA C. GREGORY

IF all things were annihilated except one solitary man, what would be left for him? Hobbes answers his own question: the single survivor's ideas and phantasms would remain. Phantasms—Rasselas knew them. One day, sitting on a bank, he feigned to himself an orphan virgin robbed by her treacherous lover, and crying after him. He started up to chase the thief as though the image were an actual plunderer. Johnson, in effect, defines the "image" he assigns to Rasselas when he identifies one great source of poetical delight with "the power of presenting pictures to the mind." The image of Rasselas, or the mental picture of Johnson's description, or the visual image of modern psychology, is the phantasm of Hobbes.

A chemist smelt ammonia as if it were present when it was not, as Rasselas saw a thief when there was none. Jack, as he reads a letter from his Jill, may hear the very accents of her voice—as auditory mental images. Hobbes does not distinguish so clearly as to-day between actual sensation and mental image when he recognizes phantasms of sound, odour, savour, hardness, softness, heat, cold, and others. He thinks mainly of the visual phantasm, however, and this corresponds closely to the visual image, as now conceived, which has so greatly preoccupied men's minds.

One of Dr. Gregory's patients dreamed, repetitively, that a skeleton clutched him by the throat. Visual images, like the grisly image of the dream-skeleton, are convincingly genuine experiences in dreams. They have also been universally admitted to be genuine experiences outside the dream, whatever these visual phantasms may be, or however they can be interpreted. For Plato and Aristotle, in the fourth century B.C., visualization is an assured experience. The fancies of hope, Plato says through Socrates, are pictured in us; a man may have a vision of a heap of gold, and the picture may include a likeness of his rejoicing self. The reminiscent man, Aristotle affirms, has an image or picture of what he remembers, and the anticipatory man of what he expects. In the seventeenth century Hobbes confidently includes visual phantasms in the legacy left to the solitary survivor by the annihilated world. Johnson, in the next century, has no qualms about providing Rasselas with a vivid mental picture. T. H. Huxley, in 1893, is as certain as his predecessors that with a song of Goethe or Shakespeare: "A series of pictures is

made to pass before your mind by the meaning of the words, and the effect is a melody of ideas". To Yushio Markino, in 1913, the pages of books look like landscapes. Eddington is not likely to doubt the existence of visual images when, as he confesses in 1928, the thought of an electron makes "a hard, red, tiny ball" rise to his mind. When he thinks of a proton, he adds, the ball is "neutral grey". The older tradition has more than a constantly confirmed faith in the actual existence of visual images; they are not only experienced, they are also needed.

The verbal sign 'tiger' is clearly distinct from its meaning—from the notion or concept of the large, Asiatic, striped, feline quadruped that haunts the Indian jungle. A picture of a tiger is, in itself, merely disposed paint, and the visual image, analogously, is, as such, merely a more or less perfectly visualized transcript of the picture or of the animal as it shows to the eye. A visualized scrap, of a stripe for instance, can mean tiger, or tigers, as the verbal sign 'tiger' can, and the painted or visualized tiger means what the stripe or verbal sign means. Aristotle clearly distinguishes between notions (or meanings) and images, but the notions, though not images, must have them. The late professor Laird did not find the images so indispensable. He can, he claims, understand a description of St. Sophia or the Golden Horn as well as any one, though he cannot visualize at all. For many centuries, so far as they can be surveyed, a non-visualizer like Laird would seem to be as fabulous as the phoenix.

The "discourse of the mind", Hobbes says in the seventeenth century, is "the perpetual arising of phantasms, both in sense and imagination . . ." The phantasms of the imagination are the modern visual images. Hobbes does not completely identify thinking with imagery, for he denies that there are images of God, soul, or spirits, but he closely connects the two—the thinking man connects the passing phantasms. He who utters the word 'triangle', Voltaire affirms in the eighteenth century, merely makes a sound if he does not image an actual triangle. Without images in the head, he urges, there is neither reasoning nor knowledge nor notion. The revolt against the indispensability of the visual image, however, had begun in the century before.

Ralph Cudworth, the Cambridge Platonist, as Aristotle had done, distinguishes clearly between the phantasms and intelligible notions or ideas—between visual image and meaning. The geometer who considers a triangle doubtless has a "phantasmatical picture of some triangle in his mind" as well as an intelligible idea of it. Phantasms, however, do not always accompany conceptions as Aristotle wrongly thought. In reading, many intelligible words are not associated with genuine phantasms; 'cause' is not, neither is 'wise'. Boyle goes further; a phantasm may make a man think wrongly. He reproves those who, when

they think of 'spirit' or 'incorporeal substance', imagine, through "vicious custom", an "aerial, or other very thin, subtil and transparent body . . ." Such a phantasm is 'extended', and a spirit is quite improperly represented by a spatially spread "image in the fancy". Such visual images probably did prompt the Cambridge Platonists to think of spirits, minds, angels, even of God himself as 'extended incorporeals'. A visualized shape, however, need not mean an extended spirit, just as the visualized verbal sign 'soul' need not mean a soul composed of letters.

In the eighteenth century Burke invites the inquirer to read the following passage: "The river Danube rises in a moist and mountainous soil in the heart of Germany, where, winding to and fro, it waters several principalities, until . . . it passes into Hungary; there . . . it quits Christendom, and, rolling through the barbarous countries which border on Tartary, it empties by many mouths in the Black Sea". Then let the reader determine "whether he has had impressed on his imagination any pictures of a river, mountain, water, soil, Germany, etc". Yushio Markino, to whom the passage would look like a landscape, would have disconcerted Burke, who does not expect a report of visual imagery. Cudworth had denied the necessity, or even the possibility, of imaging abstract notions; Burke now denies the necessity for picturing concrete mountains, rivers, and the like. This is a prelude to an onslaught on the status, and even on the existence, of the visual image.

Meaning, the psychologist Thomas Vernon Moore affirms in 1919, seems to be a conscious state *sui generis*, distinct from imagery, and prior to it. In one trend the emphasis on meaning handles the visual image roughly. It is said, for instance, to be useful when subordinate—helpful at times in difficulties. It is humbled to an accidental adjunct, and pilloried as a luxury. It is accused of aesthetic and logical crimes. Invading visual images have been said to trail irrelevances through poems, and make them choppy. They may be nastily obstructive; one speaker, Galton records, was plagued by the insistent distracting image of his manuscript.

Finally, the visual image, once an indubitable reality, and formerly deemed indispensable, is reduced by some to the phlogiston of psychology. For Watson, the arch-behaviourist who even repudiates consciousness, visual images are inevitably fictitious, but other people are more soberly doubtful or incredulous. Laird, the non-visualizer, may be said to know what he would see if his eyes fell on St. Sophia. Though some may recognize in this the source of mythical visual images, the Yushio Markinos and dreamers will not submit tamely to this diagnosis. The shades of Hobbes, however, would stare at some victims of this final onslaught on the visual image. One of them is a well known philosopher. The image is fundamentally important in memory—so thinks the

psychologist Moore. His namesake, Dr. G. E. Moore, thinks differently in 1922: there is no reason to suppose that there are any mental images.

Professor Gilbert Ryle, in *The Concept of Mind* (1949) seems to agree by writing "there are no such objects as mental pictures". Visual images seems to be quite mythical if, as he says, "things and happenings" imagined as existing "do not exist anywhere". The significant word may be "anywhere". The dream-skeleton of Dr. Gregory's patient existed, or was real, as an experience, though unlike an anatomical skeleton, it was not in a room or cupboard. Professor Ryle himself remembers a "local smithy" and the "glowing red horseshoe on the anvil." He can 'see' it, he says, using inverted commas to distinguish 'seeing' his memory-image from seeing with his eyes. This seems to concede a visual image of the glowing red horseshoe as an experience, though not as an "object", and, presumably, not located anywhere. He seems to concede visualizing experience when he calls much "ordinary thinking" an "internal monologue", which, he adds, is "usually accompanied by an internal cinematograph-show of visual imagery." Yet, later on, dreaming is *not* "being present at a private cinematograph show". The thesis of the book helps to explain, if not to resolve, the apparent contradiction.

Man has inveterately doubled himself into a body and an occupant soul or mind. Gilbert Ryle, with "deliberate abusiveness", fiercely tries to exercise this "Ghost" from the "Machine". There is no such mental occupant, no such spectator, and no mind qualified to be "a 'place', where mental pictures are seen . . ." Neither are tunes heard by such a ghostly auditor in his own fictitious ghostly place. Professor Ryle's wrath against the mental or ghostly occupant pervades his particular onslaught on the visual image. If visual images are pure fictions, there need be ghostly visualizer. If imagined sights are not sights, like mock-murders which are not murders, the "imagined sights" presumably exist in their own way, for even a sham murder occurs. If visualizing is a "special brand of make-believe" the pretence exists. Professor Ryle seems, during his expository route, to recognize experienced visualization, tough, perhaps, with an occasional lapse. He tries, among other items, to extort the confession that the visual image requires no occupant visualizer by centring his dialectical manœuvres on one debated feature of visualization.

Since a unicorn or a mermaid can be imaged, but not seen, imagery can be richer than eyesight. The visual image, however, seems ultimately to derive from sense-perception. The actual sight of horses makes it possible to image one. Women seen, and fishes seen, seem obviously to make visual images of mermaids possible. So, at least, it seems. The visual image need not be the "reborn perception" that Jean-Paul Sartre, repudiates in *The Psychology of Imagination* (1950); the visualised tiger

may be a consequence of the seen tiger, without being the seen tiger seen over again. The "dagger of the mind" copies the seen weapon closely enough for Macbeth to clutch at it, without being the original perception. A scanty visual image can be recognizably a copy of a percept, though a sketchy copy.

A copy is not the original; a visual image, Gilbert Ryle protests, is not seem. It is, nevertheless, experienced as if it were seen, like a stage-murder watched as if it were a murder, though the visualizer usually, but not always, knows he does not see. In "picturing Helvellyn", however, the fervent Ryle affirms, though there is realizing "how Helvellyn would look" yet: "There is nothing akin to sensations." Eddington's visualized red ball seems closely akin to the sensation of red. The sensory red of a poppy seems too obviously to be the promoter of the visualized colour for no kinship to exist between the two. It would seem sheerly perverse to deny that red can be visualized because it has previously been sensed on poppies or tulips. Non-visualizers or poor colour-visualizers simply cannot do what others can.

Imaging, Professor Ryle urges, is not observing. According to Alain many people report an easily evoked memory-image of the Pantheon. When asked to count the columns supporting the façade they cannot even try. M. Sartre refuses Alain's "conclusion that the image does not exist" and prefers to speak of "quasi-observation" in imagery. The observer can detect the number of columns by inspection. He can also discover it by scanning a photograph. Professor Ryle reproves those who think of the visual image as a photograph in which they can find because they can *see* it. According to Abercrombie, in 1832, an actor, suddenly called upon to perform, visualized the pages, and read his part off them. The visualized manuscript plagued the speaker, Galton records, by obtruding the erasures and corrections upon him. One calculator, Galton also found, used a visualized slide rule. The eidetic image seems to be observable, as a photograph can be scanned. The visualizer looks at a picture, and, after this is withdrawn, projects his visual image on a screen. Some can read off the image what they did not see in the picture: this happens occasionally, Jaensch says in 1930; it happens with some children up to 12, Pear says in 1937. Visualizing is, at least, more akin to sensation, or perception, than Gilbert Ryle reckons.

"I imagine", writes AE in 1919, "a group of white-robed Arabs standing on a sandy hillock, and they seem of such a noble dignity that I desire to paint them . . . I say to myself, 'I wish they would raise their arms above their heads', and at the suggestion all the figures in my vision raise their hands as if in salutation of the dawn . . ." Visual imagery is here very close, very close, to perception—to seeing. The Arabs perplex AE when they raise their arms at his wish. If the visual image follows the memory or thought, and vice versa, those visualized

arms respond to his thinking. When Goethe, with bent head and closed eyes, thought of a rose, he visualized a sort of rosette that constantly threw out petals, usually red, but sometimes green. Goethe, though M. Sartre thinks he "pretended" to grow a bud into a flower, may have thought the growth in visual images instead of in words.

To picture or image, Professor Ryle admits, "entails thinking", though in a "strained sense". Simply expressed, there is the visual image, and there is meaning, or idea or thought of concept. Meaning can be understood without any visual imagery. The reader usually has few such images (M. Sartre notes agreement on this), and often none. The verbal signs strike straight at the meaning, and any visual images are accessory. Thus when Yushio Markino sprinkles the page with images he presumably visualizes because he understands, and does not understand because he visualizes. Memory, of course, pervades all thinking or understanding. Specific recollection may remember because it images, or image because it remembers, or both may happen. The visitor to Edinburgh Castle, after seeing Mons Meg, is able to remember the cannon, and his constantly potential memory may include a potential visual image. Since a non-visualizer remembers without an image, others may well image because they remember. This seems to be usually true. Some, the suggestion now runs, may remember by imaging the cannon, and actually read off the image as if they see it. They may celebrate a triumph of memory by a vivid image, as they might hoist a flag to celebrate a victory. Even the extra item in the eidetic image might be this—a triumphant visualization of what has been belatedly remembered.

Sometimes, when one walker speaks to his fellow, a passerby merely hears sounds, and then, after a few yards, grasps what has been said. Perhaps the look at the original picture may, so to speak, see without perceiving, as the passerby hears without understanding, and the item is then perceived on the eidetic image, as the passerby, later on, understands the words.

(The author is Honorary Lecturer in the History of Science at Leeds University.)

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

THE STRENUOUS LIFE

By GRACE A. WOOD

I put myself in the way of things happening; and they happened.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

The selection of the letters of Theodore Roosevelt in four two-volume sets is the work of a team or, as the Introduction has it, "an organized company of scholars." The bulk of the one hundred thousand-odd letters available is to be found in the Library of Congress; four thousand others remain in private collections. Of this great mass some ten thousand have been selected by the editorial group for publication. As the work is commended to the "historian of America's development as a world power" and to "students of economics and historians of national and international politics and diplomacy" it is important to examine the principles governing the selection of about one-tenth of the available material. It is analysed in the Introduction in a way that leaves little doubt of the scholarly nature of the work. Letters are printed in full, in chronological order, explanatory footnotes being supplied; clear, yet detailed charts are given, and each two-volume set has its own index and appendices. Within the strict editorial ordinances laid down, and in accordance with the requirements of uniform procedure little scope remained for the specific interests of individual editors, hence the work might have been of an undue aridity. It is perhaps a tribute to the personality of Theodore Roosevelt that his letters so presented kindle in the reader some of his own joy in "life, the mere living of it."

The two volumes* under discussion deal with the period 1868-1900, under the title *The Years of Preparation*. They carry Roosevelt through his student days, and his experiences as Civil Service Commissioner, Police Commissioner, Assistant Secretary of the Navy and

Rough Rider. About half the letters deal with the last phase of his preparation for the presidency—the two years of his governorship of New York.

The letters portray the U.S.A. at the end of the Civil War, the South broken, the West not yet cognisant of the effect of the end of the Frontier period, and the Middle West preparing to challenge the supremacy of the East; a parochial America not yet aware of its place in the world. It is, therefore, of tremendous interest to read Roosevelt's comments on his own country. His letters to the great ambassador, Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, give the clearest idea of his whole-hearted Americanism, of his attitude to Britain, and of his flair for world trends. "I am too good an American, too proud of my country, not to feel ashamed and indignant when we do wrong," (I. 161) he writes. In 1898 he can say: "I feel very strongly that the English-speaking people are now closer together . . . and that every effort should be made to keep them close together; for their interests are really fundamentally the same . . ." (II. 890). Of the Russians he wrote in 1897: "I look upon them as a people to whom we can give points, and a beating; a people with a great future, as we have; but a people with poisons working in it, as other poisons . . . work in us," and forecast, "a red terror which will make the French Revolution pale." (I. 646-7)

Yet Theodore Roosevelt was no theorist. His letters on the navy, the Boer war, on Cuba, the Philippines and the Panama Canal prove him a strategist and a man of affairs. Of his own part in the war with Spain he writes so vividly that we share his revulsion at the meat scandal, his pride in his Rough Riders,

* *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, selected and edited by Elting E. Morison. Vols I and II. Harvard University Press: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 130s.

his loyalty to his friends, even his vain-glory.

For many people the interest of these volumes will lie in the portrait they give of the writer. The pattern of his relations with his children repeats his hero-worship of his Republican father, and the love of his Southern mamma. His comments on the education of boys, his pride in his sons, the tenderness of his love for his first wife, his cherishing care of his second wife, his affection for his sister, Corinne, reveal a gentler side of the Rough Rider, trust-buster, and wielder of the big stick.

Appendix IV comprises an essay by the associate editor, John M. Blum, which is intended to suggest an explanation of the complex nature of the young Theodore Roosevelt. Pointed and full of interest it yet leaves us with an enigma. That Theodore Roosevelt had qualities of greatness is admitted, and equally that he lacked some quality found only in the greatest.

There is a school of psychology that maintains that man grows up twice. It recognizes in the pre-adolescent stage a recapitulation of some earlier maturity of the race whose main characteristic is action. At adolescence this integration of the personality we are told is wrecked by new forces, and maturity is found again in a fresh integration, a re-birth of vision and power, with humility. The greatest mature completely, the less great rest in some half-way stage. That surely is one way of regarding Theodore Roosevelt. His friends discover in him "a delayed adolescence," a "turbulent energy . . . and the ability to lose oneself totally in the event." (I, XXVIII) He himself seems in later life to turn to the security of his boyhood. As late as 1915 of an expedition to Brazil he could write: "I had to go, it was my last chance to be a boy." Throughout these early volumes we find the same characteristics. So even is the texture of the thought of boy, youth and man that we wonder if the greatest Republican President since Lincoln ever completely

matured. It is the supreme interest of these letters that they reveal something of the education of this enigmatic man, of whom it was said, "he left the heart of the nation sounder and more wholesome than he found it," and kept alive the American Dream at the most critical period of democracy, a man terrible in his single-mindedness, whom his sons called "the lion" and his mother "berserker".

In a future edition perhaps it might be possible to let Tennyson's Brook follow its course unhaunted by "coot and tern" (Vol. I. XXI)? In format, paper and binding the books are excellent. Here, indeed, is richness!

THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE:

Volume I, by W. N. Medlicott.
H.M. Stationery Office and Longmans, Green. 35s.

Since Great Britain obtained command of the sea, blockade had been a natural instrument of British warfare. Professor Medlicott in his very comprehensive volume gives us the history of the way in which during the 1939-1945 war this weapon was gradually adapted to its task. The story is carried up to the German attack on Soviet Russia—the real turning point, as Professor Medlicott soberly reminds us, of the economic war. Behind the vast (and inevitable) amplification of bureaucratic detail the story is strongly dramatic. The reader is given a chance to place himself at a Hardiesque elevation above the battle. It is a stimulating experience, not without an appropriate flavour of irony.

To some extent the Ministry of Economic Warfare became the victim of its virtues. The officials simply could not believe that Hitler would plunge into a life and death struggle with such inadequate reserves, of petrol, for instance; and for a long time afterwards the Ministry credited the Germans with non-existent resources. And anyone watching the parallel activities of other Ministries from a privileged point of

vantage would have smiled to see the Ministry of Economic Warfare trying to cut off supplies from Germany while the Board of Trade was straining every nerve to stimulate exports to western Europe—exports which were bound to fall into German hands as soon as the blockade should have helped to drive the Germans to seize Belgium, the Netherlands and France.

Apart from these general difficulties there were more specific ones inherent in the nature of any blockade. There were political difficulties, which could be summed up by saying that in any blockade neutrals may have to suffer for the sins of the belligerents, and may not always suffer gladly. The forcible rationing of neutrals to prevent re-exports to Germany was typical of this sort of problem. There were also technical difficulties arising from the need to reinforce the blockade at sea by the new policy of exercising control at the source. But gradually the machinery began to work.

The blockade made Russia and Rumania the only possible sources of oil for Germany. The Germans judged it necessary to get a firmer grip on Rumanian oil, and this was one of the reasons behind the dismemberment of Rumania effected by the Vienna Award, as Ribbentrop admitted in a characteristically clumsy despatch to his Ambassador in Moscow. But Rumania was a disputed territory between Russia and Germany, and the Vienna Award gave bitter offence to the Russians. There can be no doubt that the Award and the subsequent infiltration of Germans into Rumania were among the causes of the Russo-German tension which Hitler eventually snapped by invading Russia to his own undoing. It would be too much to say that the Ministry of Economic Warfare was the sole cause of Hitler's destruction. But it is no exaggeration to say that the blockade, administered by a small staff of officials in an unimpressive office, helped to force Hitler into aggression against Russia: the one step which can be identified

more certainly than any other as engaging him in the road to ruin.

W. H. JOHNSTON

INDEPENDENT IRAQ, by Majid Khadduri. *Oxford University Press*. 21s.

Mr. Khadduri is to be congratulated on the detached and impartial attitude he has maintained while relating the story of Iraqi politics during the last 20 years. Considering to what extent political developments in the Middle East depend on personalities or emotions rather than programmes or rational argument, and how widely promises, threats or declarations of policy may differ from action taken or legislation voted, it is no mean feat to produce a narrative which carries as much conviction as this.

As will be seen from the subtitle: "A study in Iraqi politics since 1932," the book covers only the strictly political field and cannot therefore be called a history of independent Iraq; neither economic nor social questions come in for consideration, nor indeed do the influences underlying political power. The approach is so exclusively chronological that many important issues which are politically relevant receive no more than a fleeting mention at moments when they impinge upon the central theme. Thus the Assyrians, the Kurds and even the Arab tribes themselves appear only as characterless entities whose occasional revolts are ruthlessly suppressed by successive central governments, and religious influences, such as the relationships between Sunni and Shi'a Moslems, are barely touched on.

Among the useful impressions which this book leaves is the steadying effect of the monarchy, particularly during the reign of the first King Feisal; the advice which the ruling house has tendered to political leaders has consistently been in favour of moderation and has often urged the introduction of more democratic methods of government. The politicians fare less well; their actions seem regularly to be dictated more by ambition

and opportunism than by any sense of public responsibility. One of the most opportunist of them all is quoted as having aptly compared the sequence of Cabinet reshuffles with the motion of a merry-go-round, which a queue of impatient politicians constantly endeavoured to bring to a halt simply in order that they themselves might have a turn in one of the few available seats. It was this irresponsibility which eventually led the politicians to look for backing among the senior ranks of the Iraqi army, with the result that from 1935 until the British military intervention of 1941 governments rose and fell at the will of the dominant clique of officers.

There are several lessons in this story which would repay study by other nations newly achieving independence; among them that political parties cannot hold together indefinitely on negative slogans only, that an administration will not be efficient if the high offices of the civil service and of local government are made part of the spoils of the political struggle and that free elections demand a degree of altruism and responsibility seldom found among politicians who have no traditions to guide and restrain them. It is also worthy of note that in this full account of political developments in Iraq since the end of the British Mandate there is no evidence before or after the 1939-1945 war of British interference in internal affairs. That no attempt is made to conceal the shortcomings of the first generation of Iraqi public figures, or to blame them on others, is testimony to the author's impartiality as a historian.

NIGEL BRUCE

VENTURE TO THE INTERIOR,
by Laurens van der Post. *Hogarth Press*. 12s. 6d.

BEYOND EAST AND WEST, by
John C. H. Wu. *Sheed and Ward*. 21s.

To say that Colonel Van der Post is versatile, indeed one of the most versatile of authors is almost an understatement.

He takes us delightfully and perilously on his African journeys and fascinatingly into the recesses of his mind. Of Dutch ancestry he longs for the proper understanding and tolerance of the black people. He deplores what some of the Europeans are doing, who "with their blind intolerance divert and disorganize it [the two-way flow of traffic] to their own impoverishment and embitterment, as my countrymen do in Southern Africa."

This book is the result of an expedition undertaken, at the British Government's request, to certain almost unknown parts of Nyasaland. We can learn a good deal about a man by ascertaining what is in his luggage, and the Colonel, with ample supplies of food (and a bottle of whisky for his guests) takes a prayer-book and Meredith's *Modern Love*. He must be a charming person to travel with, for he tells us that there is no power on earth like imagination and that the worst, most obstinate grievances are imagined ones.

How profoundly he understands the joyful and the tragic drama of the African's life: its glory and its humiliation. "He goes to the night as if to a friend. He finds his way through the day with reluctant, perfunctory feet." As for the white people, "we turn our hate," says the Colonel, "on to the native, the dark people of the world, because we have trampled on our own dark natures. Already there is the smell of murder approaching far off in the sky over Africa. And this need not be, that is the pity of it. If we could but make friends with our inner selves, come to terms with our own darkness, then there would be no trouble from without."

We are given some exquisite portraits of European men and women, as also of Africans. There is, for instance, an old native forester with beautiful manners and the most serene expression. He had long given up visiting his descendants in the plain below and he hardly bothered about his wages any more. "That old man," says the Colonel, "knew some-

thing really worth knowing."

That is also the case with Mr. John Wu, a very accomplished Chinese Christian, who became a Methodist in the year 1917. Six years later we find him as a research student in the Harvard Law School and a close friendship comes about with the famous Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Mr. Wu's sister maintains that for a judge to receive gifts for doing justice is not bribery. This enraged Mr. Wu so much that he threw the furniture at his sister. With the wife whom his family had found for him while he was still very young he became somewhat critical, for she had no education to speak of. He therefore desired to acquire a more educated concubine, a course to which his amiable wife had no objection. She only suggested he should wait until he was 40 years of age, and a few days before this happened "the all-merciful Father had better plans; He

snatched me from the grip of the Devil and saved me from myself. I was received into the Holy Catholic Church."

In other respects Mrs. Wu had been extremely satisfactory, for she had presented her husband with more than fourteen children, and we are given a delightful photograph of the family with the Pope in the centre of the group. Mr. Wu had become Chinese Minister to the Vatican. It was, he says, the first time in the diplomatic history of the Holy See that a Catholic ever represented a non-Catholic nation. That is not quite accurate, for the late Count de Salis, after being British Minister to Montenegro, was the first Envoy from Britain to the Vatican and not the least reason for his appointment there was his membership of the Catholic Church. "The great man," said Mencius, "is one who has not lost the heart he had as a child." And as we follow the career of Mr. Wu we revel in every phase of it. When he

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

COLONIAL ANNUAL REPORTS

Reports for 1950 are now being published. Recently issued:

NORTHERN RHODESIA	3s. 6d. (3s. 8d.)	UGANDA	4s. 6d. (4s. 9d.)
MAURITIUS	4s. 6d. (4s. 9d.)	SARAWAK	10s. 6d. (10s. 10d.)
JAMAICA	6s. 0d. (6s. 4d.)	FEDERATION OF MALAYA	10s. 6d. (10s. 10d.)

AN ECONOMIC SURVEY OF THE COLONIAL TERRITORIES

Volume I

The Central African and High Commission Territories (Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland). With maps. 25s. (25s. 3d.)

Volume III

The West African Territories (The Gambia, Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) and St. Helena. With maps. 25s. (25s. 3d.)

Prices in brackets include postage

HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

York House, Kingsway, London W.C.2; 429 Oxford Street, London W.1 (Post Orders: P.O. Box 569, London S.E.1); 13A Castle Street, Edinburgh 2; 39 King Street, Manchester 2; 2 Edmund Street, Birmingham 3; 1 St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff; Tower Lane, Bristol 1; 80 Chichester Street, Belfast; or through any bookseller.

was a young man he wrote that to be a Chinese of his generation is to be a very much bewildered person; that may still be true. But while China can produce such men as our author we can regard that great country with confident hope.

HENRY BAERLEIN

URUGUAY, by George Pendle. *Royal Institute of International Affairs*. 11s. 6d.

In the world of books Latin America is still, so far as this country is concerned, *terra quasi incognita*. In the United States numerous volumes, large and small, expert and inexpert, have been written on the 20 Latin republics in the last 25 years. But Britain, with all her traditional links with, and material interests in, Latin America has almost entirely failed to produce any noteworthy book on that vast region since James Bryce described a part of it in his *South America; Observations and Impressions*, in 1912. And even that was published in New York.

A British publisher told me recently that, in Britain, books on Latin America "don't sell". From that expert opinion it is legitimate to deduce that the British public has yet to have its interest aroused in a part of the world as rich in romance as South-east Asia, and as full of potentialities for social and economic earthquakes.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs has lately begun production of a series of slim books on some of the South American republics, and it was to be hoped that these well-produced and not expensive volumes would play their part in awakening the attention of the British reading public to the lands of Perón, Vargas and Cardenas no less than of Pizarro, Cortez and Cabral.

But it is doubtful, to me, whether this will happen. Let it be said at once that this is no fault of the authors of the two books in this series already published. Both the present volume, and its predecessor, on Chile, are written so much to the same pattern that it is clear that the writers of these books are following a

set form. And set it undoubtedly is—to the extent that these books bear a strong resemblance to the reports on economic conditions in foreign countries (admirable in themselves) which are produced by H.M. Stationery Office. The present volume, like its predecessor, is weighed down with statistics and table interspersed in the text. And a full list, with names and tonnage, of the fleet of tankers and self-propelled barges owned by the Uruguayan State Oil Monopoly appears superfluous. It would have been more satisfactory to have a minimum of figures and statistical material in the text, and to have had, instead, an appendix with whatever mathematical evidence was thought to be necessary. As it is, this book is unlikely to appeal to the general reader, for it smothers its subject, a very individual country with a very individual people, under a mass of figures.

Let it be said, however, that, for the specialist, Mr. Pendle has done his work well. He covers every aspect of Uruguayan endeavour with accuracy and completeness. In particular, his account of the similarities and differences between the Colorado and Blanco parties on page 90 should be made compulsory reading for all those who habitually regard Latin American politics through British party spectacles. Altogether Mr. Pendle has produced an admirable source-book. But it is rather a collection of most of the materials needed to paint a picture of Uruguay than the picture itself.

N. P. MACDONALD

NO PICNIC ON MOUNT KENYA, by Felice Benuzzi. *William Kimber*. 15s.

The appeal of this story lies in a vivid contrast between the boredom of prison life and the sense of personal freedom experienced by the mountaineer. Felice Benuzzi, an official of the Italian Colonial Service, was a P.O.W. in 1943 in a British camp on the Equator, near the foot of Mount Kenya. It is not without interest, after reading a crop of

British 'escape' books, to study these problems from the enemy viewpoint. Depressed beyond endurance by the dullness of camp routine, Signor Benuzzi plans not so much a break-out for good in the tradition of the 'Wooden Horse' or the 'Escaping Club' as a sally to climb the 17,000-foot peak which faces and challenges him. He leaves for the British commandant a written parole that he and his two companions will return within fourteen days. The exploit ends with a break into camp again, at the end of their adventures.

The hazards of this journey were formidable. When the peacetime mountaineer sets out from Zermatt or Chamonix, to scale lower peaks than Mount Kenya, he has all the advantages of modern equipment, accurate maps and even the service of guides if needed. Moreover, he does not reckon to find the lower slopes of the Matterhorn or Mont Blanc infested with rhinoceros, buffalo or bull-elephant, nor must his approach be made through a matted tangle of bamboo-forest. For this expedition all the necessities, even the component parts of primitive ice-axes, had to be filched, painfully assembled and laboriously concealed. Their only map was a striking black, yellow and red label from an Oxo tin, showing an outline of Mount Kenya. (Incidentally why is so lively a story not embellished with a few good photographs? No-one would demand that a camera should be conjured up among equipment in which even the crampons were improvised from prison-wire; but surely at least a proper black-and-white of Mount Kenya itself could have been included later.)

The author, familiar with hill country from early days amongst Dolomites and Julian Alps, tells a graphic story in which his love of the heights is apparent from the moment he sees his "ethereal mountain emerging from a sea of clouds, framed between two dark barracks." His exploit contains also, perhaps, a parable for the hyper-sophisticated 'centrist' of fashionable Alpine valleys, who loves to

festoon his peaks with nylon ropes and hammer pitons into them until they bristle like porcupines. Surely the joy of mountain climbing is to be found in a gay and enterprising spirit rather than in the perfection of mechanical skill? This episode of Mount Kenya reveals a man whom the shades of Whymper, and of his great Italian rival, Carrel, might salute as a fellow adventurer in the wide fraternity of climbers.

RUPERT MARTIN

ECUMENISM AND CATHOLICITY, by William Nicholls. *S.C.M. Press.* 12s. 6d.

THE MYSTERY OF LOVE AND MARRIAGE, by Derrick Sherwin Bailey. *S.C.M. Press.* 12s. 6d.

At first approach it will naturally seem that these two books cannot possibly have anything in common, except publisher and price; in point of fact the reader soon finds that two subjects of the widest

Hutchinson's

BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Sir Reader Bullard, *K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.I.E*

H.M. Minister (later Ambassador) to Persia, 1939-46

"It is the first serious attempt to produce a critical history of the Middle East from what may be described as the official British point of view. It will be a standby for many years to come."

WORLD REVIEW.

"It is a history, but the bulk of it deals with modern problems that are retailed with the accuracy of a shrewd eye-witness as well as with a decorous wit."

THE ECONOMIST.

"The present problems of Britain's new eastern frontier (no longer the Rhine but the Red Sea and Persian Gulf) are discussed with expert knowledge and cool common sense."

OXFORD MAGAZINE.

Two endpaper maps.

7s. 6d.

University Library

divergence are approached by the two authors with an astonishing similarity of purpose and of method. The similarity of method may well indicate a new trend in contemporary theology (a very different thing, let it be said at once, from any so-called "New Theology" of which there is no trace); the similarity of purpose is due to the simple fact that both authors are dealing with the identical problem, in however differing contexts: the problem of reunion. There is dire need for reunion of the widely separated Churches of Christendom and there is hardly less need for re-establishing marriage as the firm and abiding union it once generally was but to-day all too often is not.

Both writers approach their different aspects from a high level of orthodox theology, as will be generally agreed by all, despite the fact that both happen to be clergymen of the Church of England; what may be new, and has certainly not always been the case with theologians, is that both make their approach from within. They start from a factual and "given" situation, whether they like it or not, and seek where honest theological thinking may lead them from there; they do not seek to fit a distraught human situation into a "given" theology, nor utterly condemn that situation unless and until it does so fit. In other words, they both believe that honesty of purpose in man will still enable the Spirit of God to guide him out of his difficulties and that "the faith once delivered to the saints," while in itself immutable, should yet be interpreted in the light of new knowledge and of fresh experience. And they are very right. The Scribes and Pharisees failed not because of what they held and believed but because they had become set and would not believe that God is ever leading men through fresh experience to new aspects of unchanging truth. Whatever the reader may think of the substance or argument of either of these books, he can but be encouraged and gladdened by the enlightened honesty which informs them.

Both books are closely written for the serious student, though by no means only for the professional one, so that it is uneasy to give a brief account of their substance and contents. Mr. Nicholls starts from actual experience of ecumenical gatherings (that awkward and rather forbidding word 'ecumenical' seems to have come to stay) in which members of widely separated churches not only find how much they have in common but get a fresh vision of what the Church, inevitably involved in the process of history, is meant to be in the ultimate and extra-historical purposes of God, and outlines possible ways in which she may here and now better adjust herself to those purposes; Mr. Bailey centres his study around the ultimate status and significance of marriage as the "one flesh" which Christ declared it to be. Both are fresh thinkers, though neither is "startling"; and both, as befits men looking for future guidance, are fully conscious of past history. Both are strongly to be commended to all who are interested in either aspect, ecclesiastical or matrimonial, of what in many other aspects also is surely the most crying need of our time: union and, where there has been a disrupted union, re-union.

JOHN HALET

PHILOSOPHERS LEAD SHELTERED LIVES, by James K. Feibleman. *Allen & Unwin*. 25s.

On the wrapper this book is described as James K. Feibleman's Autobiography, and on the title page we learn, if we did not know it already, that the author is Graduate Professor of Philosophy in the Tactim University of Louisiana and that this is a first volume of memoirs. It is an odd, unequal but extremely interesting performance, but unfortunately the aim which the story hopes to achieve is too often blurred by the irrelevant details that intrude to give us far too much background. This aim may be defined as the recognition of the prime importance of philosophy and the leading of the reader into the realm of metaphysics;

moreover, it is for those who have not made that journey before.

It is a pity therefore that the numerous reminiscences of artistic and literary celebrities (and indeed non-celebrities) are so plentiful; they do nothing to make it easier to get inside the philosopher's mind or to understand how it works. Even their entertainment value is doubtful, and it is not by this form of entertainment that the reader is likely to acquire a little philosophy of his own.

Professor Feibleman tells us that he is already the author of one book of poems, six volumes of philosophy and some short stories, all published. Altogether he has written, indeed, more than this and he has planned many, many more volumes; if nothing happens to prevent him, he intends to write them all. But he considers autobiography a sin; his flesh creeps when in print he discovers the presence of the awful first person pronoun, and he reminds us that philosophers are famous just in proportion to the extent to which their personal histories are forgotten. Why then did he write this book of which he himself says: "This is a book to be forgotten"?

The answer seems to lie in his belief that a man's work should not be interpreted in terms of his life, but rather his life in terms of his work. He does not think that his own life is important, nor does he confuse, as so many do, the world in which he lives with himself; but he feels that certain aspects of the world can be better understood by telling how he, the person he knows so well, felt their effect. And so he writes from the point of view of the true scientist, who is perhaps a rarer figure than we imagine, a man who believes that what he has done would have been accomplished by someone else if he had not come along to do it.

It is for such perceptions as this that the book may be read and enjoyed, and there are many of them. Professor Feibleman is on the side of the angels; he knows that only half of life is logic, and that action should be from feeling

rather than from reason, because the reasons behind feelings are sounder and more profound than those we hold consciously. This is an optimistic book in the sense that we look forward to a world of the future which is always capable of being better than in the past it has ever been. Such an outlook is far from the sterile belief in the inevitability of progress, and takes its stand on the knowledge that love is so vital that it makes even hopeless struggles worthwhile, and glories in values that cannot be utterly destroyed.

J. F. BURNET

THE LANGUAGE OF SHAKESPEARE'S PLAYS, by B. Ifor Evans. *Methuen*. 18s.

One's first feeling on seeing the list of books by the same author opposite to the title-page is one of wonder how Dr. Ifor Evans, lately Principal of Queen Mary College and now Provost of University College, has managed to combine with his heavy administrative duties the functions of critic, biographer, editor, novelist and recorder of travel. And when one opens his latest publication 'still the wonder grows,' for his study of Shakespeare's language is so full and suggestive that it might seem as if he had been specializing for long in this particular field. He analyzes Shakespeare's linguistic development through every play in the canon, except *Titus Andronicus*, *Timon of Athens*, *Pericles* and *Henry VIII*, in all of which Shakespeare's is probably not the sole hand. He rightly emphasizes that "language in drama must be referred to the effect that it can make in the theatre," on those "who stood or sat around the Elizabethan stage and listened to a dramatic action." He also insists on the recognition of Shakespeare's use of two styles, the one simple and direct, the other ornate and rhetorical.

It is the latter that predominates in *Love's Labour's Lost* which Dr. Evans takes as his starting point. "It is with words, not with plot and characters, that

the play lives. They are words sought for their own sake, words dancing to unexpected rhythms, and twisting themselves into fantastic shapes." And as Dr. Evans does well to remind us, with Shakespeare "the fascination of words themselves, their sound and shape . . . remained with him to the end as a power capable in moments of danger of overwhelming any other purpose he had in hand." In the other early comedies there was more incident and less of verbal entertainment, but it was in the early history plays where Shakespeare had to deal with epic material that, as Dr. Evans epigrammatically puts it: "Action becomes the task-master of language," and he proceeds to illustrate their differentiation in diction from the comedies. In *A Midsummer Night's Dream* Shakespeare seems to be enjoying a sense of release from the difficulties of the histories, and he combines passages of direct speech with lyrical sonnetting effects. In *Romeo and Juliet* similar features are found but Shakespeare shows himself more self-conscious in the adjustment of language to the different characters, especially on the lips of Mercutio and the Nurse.

Dr. Evans distinguishes, to a degree some may question, between the two Parts of *Henry IV*. In Part I he lays stress on "the bold and original verse relying on an emblazoned language." In Part II it is the prose scenes, with Falstaff as the central figure, that exhibit Shakespeare's powers in masterly fashion. In contrast with Caroline Spurgeon he singles out the scene in the Boar's Head Tavern (Act II, iv) and that in Shallow's garden as of highest linguistic quality.

It may be thought that Dr. Evans gives scarcely proportionate weight to the brilliant group of mature comedies in passing from them to *Hamlet*. And here he strikes an original note in linking together, of all people, the most dissimilar pair. "Hamlet, the Renaissance prince, is a philologist, as is Polonius, and they alone of the characters in the

tragedies could have witnessed a performance of *Love's Labour's Lost* and known what the comedy was about." Words, as in *Love's Labour's Lost*, have in *Hamlet* gained an independent importance, but they are now subdued into the service of the action. In one of his most penetrating chapters Dr. Evans illustrates this in detail.

The dark comedies prepare the way for the later tragedies, with *Troilus and Cressida* standing out in "an almost aggressive isolation linguistically." A striking feature is the use in it of words not found elsewhere in the plays, for example, 'tortive', 'mastic', 'soilure'. *Othello* carries on the imagery of corruption, especially on the lips of Iago, while the Moor's speeches have at first a soldierly simplicity, gradually more and more charged with emotion. Macbeth, on the other hand, is the most poetic of criminals whose imaginative language concentrates similes into single word metaphors. *King Lear* is acclaimed by Dr. Evans as the apex of Shakespeare's mastery of diction, combining all "linguistic patterns from plain and concentrated statement to the very phantasms of speech" and yet leaving the final impression of unity. With his comments on the Roman plays and the dramatic romances Dr. Evans closes a volume which may be warmly commended not only to linguistic specialists but to Shakespearian students and actors in general.

F. S. BOAS

PRINTER'S PROGRESS 1851-1951, by Charles Rosner. *Sylvan Press*. 42s.

Among the many permanent souvenirs of the Festival of Britain this volume will rank as one of the most satisfying, full of colour and charm. It is in no sense a complete survey of printing during the century but by contrasting the narrow variety available in 1851 with to-day's examples it displays the limitations of the one with the wide freedoms

of the other.

The first half of the last century had seen the rapid development of printing machinery; up to that time this had been almost entirely a manual craft. The revolution in printing processes brought about by the development of the camera is liberally illustrated with many examples of modern colour printing. These pages are a signpost to the possibilities of the future use of colour.

The impact of the competition of the spoken word in radio and the visual image in television with the printed word in literature has yet to be resolved. This volume ably demonstrates how eagerly the challenge is being accepted by the present Caxtons; its price also demonstrates their greatest handicap.

HERBERT T. BANYARD

WILKIE COLLINS, by Robert Ashley. *Arthur Barker*. 7s. 6d.

The first attempt at a biography of Wilkie Collins was made by Ernst von Wolzogen in his book *Wilkie Collins: Ein Biographisch-Kritischer Versuch*, published in Leipzig in 1885. Mr. Ashley describes it as "inaccessible and unrewarding" shedding "surprisingly little light on the life and character of the novelist," and he applies the same criticism to another German study, Hans Sehlbach's *Untersuchungen über die Romankunst von Wilkie Collins* (1931). The first full-length biography is Mr. Kenneth Robinson's *Wilkie Collins*, published in November 1951, and reviewed in THE FORTNIGHTLY of February 1952. It is now followed by Mr. Ashley's book, which was evidently completed before Mr. Robinson's appeared.

There is a lack of contemporary documents relating to Collins's life. He kept no diary, his letters to Dickens, his closest friend, perished in the bonfire Dickens, annoyed at press invasion of his privacy, made of his correspondence, and Collins also towards the end of his life destroyed his own collection of letters. Forster and other friends of Dickens in

his later years were jealous of Collins, and in their writings either ignored or disparaged him. Moreover, for many years his private life was irregular and, as Mr. Ashley says, "soon became enveloped in a fog of mystery which to this day has not been appreciably dispelled." But Mr. Ashley, who is a Harvard graduate, has in his extensive research taken great pains to identify and study the documents available in this country and in America, and his book is specially rich in bibliographical references.

He divides the literary career of Collins, who was born in 1834, into four periods. After his apprentice years, ending in 1851, in which he brought out his first novel *Antonia*, he became with *Basil*, *Hide and Seek*, and *The Dead Secret* a "Journeyman Novelist" and in 1860-70 developed into a "Master Craftsman", writing five novels of high quality: *The Woman in White*, *No Name*, *Armadale*, *The Moonstone*, and *Man and Wife*. From 1871 until his death in 1889, he was an "Emeritus Novelist", completing twelve novels and beginning a thirteenth, which was finished by Walter Besant. The works of this period are generally regarded as much inferior to those of his prime, but Mr. Ashley maintains that they hardly ever fail to be readable, and points out that they were widely read both in English and in translations. Collins was a very careful worker; most of his books were rewritten seven times after the first draft. He was a keen business man, assiduous in protecting his copyrights, and insistent in securing the full market value of his output. In his later years he suffered much from arthritis, and like Coleridge and De Quincey, sought relief from pain in opium, and became, as they did, addicted to the drug, experiencing the horrors so vividly described by Ezra Jennings in *The Moonstone*. Collins was remarkable in his personality as well as in his writings, and in this book Mr. Ashley gives us an admirable account of his life and work.

G. F. McCLEARY

BOOKS ON THE TABLE

The month has been enriched by the Royal Society of Arts' Cantor lectures on the modern theatre—Mr. Peter Ustinov "The Playwright", Sir Ralph Richardson "The Actor" and Mr. Tyrone Guthrie "The Producer". Lacking the egotism that is supposed to pervade professional talk of the theatre like a smell, these were 'performances' so incandescent with intelligence and zeal, with such sparklings of wit studding the solid and often profound, with so lively an individual comprehension of the overlapping problems of all three spheres, and with such commonsense and good humour too ("What is an apron stage?" and "Who is Raimu?" were two of the questions answered by Sir Ralph with no visible flinching), that one came away each time full of laughter, energy and thought, and a tendency to be absent-minded with the traffic in the Strand. The pleasures of memory are to be reinforced early in May when the *Journal* of the R.S.A. is to publish the three lectures together; meanwhile, their influence still strong, a book about the creator of *The Seagull*, *Uncle Vanya*, *The Three Sisters* and *The Cherry Orchard* gets first mention here.

Chekhov

David Magarshack, who has made a new translation of the first (unseen, and according to the publisher's announcement, for *The Seagull Produced by Stanislavsky* (Dennis Dobson, 25s.), Edited and Introduced by S. D. Balukhaty), now presents his CHEKHOV THE DRAMATIST (*John Lehmann*, 21s.) as a challenge to the bafflement that is common to producers, actors, critics and audience. For solutions the author takes us back, beyond the misinterpretations of the plays by the Moscow Arts Theatre, beyond Chekhov's oft-reiterated and anguished pleas that he was "describing life, ordinary life, and not blank despondency," to the dramatist's own ideas of art and technique which in turn proclaim

his debt to the classical Greek drama in which he was so deeply read. The book's main sections are entitled "Plays of Direct Action" and "Plays of Indirect Action" linked by a study of the transition period, and providing plenty of clues to support Mr. Magarshack's contentions. These should earn the unstinted attention of all who have a rational love of the theatre, and, if it is disappointing not to have his opinions on some notable and ever-memorable London productions of the plays during the past twenty-or-so years, he has much to tell in compensation of historic, literary and dramatic interest that is new and almost as stimulating as his theories. To give but one example of these: that the characters in *The Cherry Orchard* are "essentially comic" demands, after the first refusal to believe it, further consideration and perhaps later a cautious or unwilling assent.

To bridge a gap

No such searchings attend the enjoyment of the next book; we all comprehend in our delight that GILBERT AND SULLIVAN (*Max Parrish*. 7s. 6d.) are "essentially comic" even though—and probably because—we detect a vein of cruelty in the one and a gentle wish to soften it in the other. Arthur Jacobs has written so knowledgeable a survey of the partnership and embellished it with so many reproductions of sketches, cartoons, parts of scores, programmes, letters and music covers that it would be a pity if his slim volume should be overshadowed by the contemporary Baily tome. Presumably to G. & S. addicts there is room for both; nevertheless a special word must be said for this music critic, some of whose chapter-headings, "Burlesque in Long Clothes", "The Importance of Gilbert", "The Stage is the Key", are pointers to the quality of their contents. "The light musical stage" concludes Mr. Jacobs "is surely the place where the disastrous gap between

"serious" and "popular" music could best be bridged.

The world of opera

How both kinds were brought to the land of the Czars is told in Martin Cooper's *RUSSIAN OPERA*, another of the World of Music series (*Max Parrish*. 7s. 6d.). This was a luxury imported from Italy in 1731. Later French *opéra comique* appeared, and by 1804 Derzhavin is complaining that "the taste now is all for amusing operas with marvellous decorations," but after the defeat of Napoleon heroic themes were not unnaturally the note. With Glinka "grand opera" in the French sense began, with the Italian style still holding its own in St. Petersburg. In the later nineteenth century "the mighty handful", including Musorgsky, were composing, for Anton Rubinstein had founded the St. Petersburg Conservatory of Music in 1862 and the one in Moscow was due to his brother Nicholas four years later. It was not long before the appearance of Tchaikovsky's masterpiece *Eugene Onegin* and the date, 1879, heralded the golden age of 30 years in Russian opera, with Borodin and Rimsky-Korsakov shining bright. The complex story is told easily by Mr. Cooper, another practising music critic, and blest with an ironic as well as a scholarly pen, illustrated by stage sketches and designs, and portraits of monarchs and musicians.

Gestation

Much more portentous is the concoction called *MAKING A FILM* (*Allen & Unwin*. 17s. 6d.), as the title page affirms: "The Story of *Secret People*. Chronicled and Edited by Lindsay Anderson. Together with the Shooting Script of the Film by Thorold Dickinson and Wolfgang Wilhelm." There are graphs and charts to show the schedule, the cross plot and the location at any given day. One likes especially in the props column of the last: "Knife for Steenie (prop one with handle absorbing blade)." There are a list of post shooting period dates, a studio plan, the two

themes of the music that "is intrinsic to the story and reinforces its emotional development" set out for the right hand, and there are dozens of photographs. A diary of beginnings, preparation and shooting is given on the lines of these extracts:

November 27—With a pleased surprise, somehow reminiscent of Mr. Brontë's discovery of *Jane Eyre*, Thorold announces that Roberto Gerhard has submitted a piano-sketch of the Ballet, and that it is exactly the sort of thing he wants.

March 8—Thorold, Charles and Spike make an expedition into Soho, in search of further atmosphere. Over cups of coffee they sit in the original of Anselmo's Café and observe and talk to the customers. Charles inspects the kitchen, assimilates the techniques, and spends a long time watching the boss tie his apron on.

We all have an urge "to go behind the scenes" yet a plod through this "complete report of the extremely diverse operations which go to make a modern film," and notwithstanding a most cordial respect for the previous work of Ealing Studios, leaves one without any desire to see the film, conveniently shown simultaneously, or indeed to take the book other than facetiously. Somebody should now write a treatise (about a tenth as long as this one) to explain to general readers why they are left with the impression that the proceedings are largely 'hoo-ey', 'phoney' and unworthy of 'a row of beans'; the final chapter should of course be able to show how this churlish hersey is to be overcome.

The fastidious palate

Much more convincing, in spite of the difficulties of this era, is the cult of gastronomy. The secret is not so much the actual participation, which is beyond most of us anyway, but the power its contemplation has to set us dreaming. This is exactly what *THE GOURMET'S WEEK-END BOOK* (*Seeley Service*. 12s. 6d.) does for capable-of-being-enchanted readers who are borne off to wherever the lovely names of wines are household words. Those of us who have modestly tasted them at first hand in France and Italy and Portugal and Spain

can return to holiday sunshine and grape-clad terraces, to cool breezes from the darkening Adriatic, Mediterranean, or North Atlantic, at the turn of a page. And not only are the subtleties and the practicalities of food and drink discussed but there is much to be learnt of history and tradition enshrined in behaviour and polite usage. There are chapters on tips, toasts, acorns, rats and pokeweed, and on "Some Memories of Edwardian London Restaurateurs."

Bygones

Which brings us straight to V. Sackville-West's *THE EDWARDIANS* (*Chatto & Windus*. 7s. 6d.). A fairly recent visit to Knole, the home of the Sackvilles near Sevenoaks in Kent, rightly or wrongly vividly recalled the Chevron of this book, and now a delighted re-reading rightly or wrongly vividly recalls Knole. Leaving Sebastian fingering his coronet after the coronation of George V we go into the new Elizabethan age with a wish that something of that vanished charm might even now return.

The pigsty

Turning from this graciously written book to Calder Willingham's *END AS A MAN* (*John Lehmann*. 10s. 6d.) one pukes. This is the favourite expression of the inhabitants of the American military academy for the training of officers whose sordid antics make the tale. One must quarrel with the jacket announcement of the publisher, for whose taste and judgment one had always been prepared to vouch: "Mr. Willingham gives us his ironic comment", for this is a plain report without comment of thuggery, lying, treachery, perversion and unrelieved bad manners. As for the "scandalous wit" that is also claimed for him—it is possibly implicit in the ponderous speeches of the general commanding the school and that is all. More's the pity; for had Mr. Willing-

ham leavened the boorish lump with some fun-poking we should have had a hope that his story was exaggerated. As it is we are left only with dismay for a situation that is drawing the soldiers of our two nations together for the confounding of Russian hordes. If this book is factual, the controlling of barbarians should in America begin, like charity, at home; true or false, the Communists in London no less than in New York should hail it with cheers.

Adulthood

So away from Willingham wallowings, to where the urbane Aubrey Menen beckons like a signpost to civilization. He calls *THE DUKE OF GALLODORO* (*Chatto & Windus*. 12s. 6d.) the first work of his maturity. By the same token everyone who read with joy *The Prevalence of Witches* will agree that it carried no marks of the cradle, nor can *The Backward Bride* and *The Stumbling Stone* be said to proclaim the agonies of adolescence—one boggles at any suggestion that a precocious child wrote these books. This time Mr. Menen gives us an Englishman with an Italian title who lives in a villa on the cliff above a town that bears a dear resemblance to Amalfi. Perhaps the steps by which the urchin Peppin and the Duke are brought filially together are over-long and, like the hillside, a bit steep, but there is the delicious Salvator to help, of whose begging-letter genius and philosophy we could never have too much. There is also the first person telling the story, a shadow but of a tangible and likable man, who writes of cheat and liar with a gentle mockery that asks for our co-operation in discernment and sympathy. And he gets it; he has no disgust for his characters, nor does he laugh at them, and without exactly laughing with them he makes us understand why he loves them.

GRACE BANYARD